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Wesley J .  Campbell 
 
Commandeering and Constitutional Change 
abstract.  Coming in the midst of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution, Printz v. 
United States held that federal commandeering of state executive officers is “fundamentally 
incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.” The Printz majority’s 
discussion of historical evidence, however, inverted Founding-era perspectives. When Federalists 
such as Alexander Hamilton endorsed commandeering during the ratification debates, they were 
not seeking to expand federal power. Quite the opposite. The Federalists capitulated to states’ 
rights advocates who had recently rejected a continental impost tax because Hamilton, among 
others, insisted on hiring federal collectors rather than commandeering state collectors. The 
commandeering power, it turns out, was an integral aspect of the Anti-Federalist agenda because 
it facilitated federal use of state and local officers, thus ensuring greater local control over federal 
law enforcement and averting the need for a bloated federal bureaucracy. These priorities carried 
over into the First Congress, where Anti-Federalists were among the most vehement defenders 
of the federal power to commandeer state executive and judicial officers. Ironically, though 
understandably when viewed in context, it was Federalists who first planted the seeds of the 
anticommandeering doctrine. Incorporating recently uncovered sources and new interpretations, 
this Article aims to significantly revise our understanding of Founding-era attitudes toward 
federal commandeering of state officers. Moreover, the Article explains why early Congresses 
generally shunned the use of state officers and how this custom combined with shifting political 
priorities to quickly erode what once had been a strong consensus favoring commandeering’s 
constitutionality. 
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introduction 
The United States Constitution says little about who should enforce federal 
law. During the ratification debates, however, Federalists frequently remarked 
that the federal government would “make use of the State officers” for that 
purpose.1 Indeed, one of the principal advantages of the proposed Federal 
Constitution over the Articles of Confederation, Alexander Hamilton argued in 
Federalist No. 27, was that the Constitution would not “only operate upon the 
States in their political or collective capacities” but would also “enable the 
[federal] government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each [state] in the 
execution of its laws.”2 With “all officers legislative, executive and judicial in 
each State . . . bound by the sanctity of an oath” to observe federal law, 
Hamilton continued, “the Legislatures, Courts and Magistrates of the 
respective members will be incorporated into the operations of the national 
government . . . and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.”3 
In other words, state officers would be duty bound to enforce federal law. 
Over two centuries later, the Supreme Court rejected a federal power to 
require state executive officers to enforce federal law—a practice now known as 
commandeering—calling it “fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”4 The Court dismissed Hamilton’s 
remarks as unrepresentative of broader Founding-era constitutional 
understanding, explaining that Hamilton’s statements reflected “the most 
expansive view of federal authority ever expressed, and from the pen of the 
most expansive expositor of federal power.”5 
 
1.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 227-28 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
2.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 1, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton). 
3.  Id. at 175. 
4.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). The anticommandeering doctrine also 
prevents Congress from imposing federal duties on state legislatures. See New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Current doctrine allows commandeering of state judges 
in some circumstances. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 740 (2009) (“[H]aving made 
the decision to create courts of general jurisdiction that regularly sit to entertain analogous 
suits, New York is not at liberty to shut the courthouse door to federal claims that it 
considers at odds with its local policy.”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 905-07 (distinguishing the 
federal duties placed on state courts from those placed on state executive officers). However, 
“there remain significant unanswered questions regarding the constitutional relationship 
between congressional power and state court jurisdiction.” Anthony J. Bellia Jr., 
Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 950 (2006). 
5.  Printz, 521 U.S. at 915 n.9. Justice Scalia also asserted that what Hamilton really intended to 
say in Federalist No. 27 was that state officers would “enact, enforce, and interpret state law 
in such fashion as not to obstruct the operation of federal law.” Id. at 913. As a 
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Hamilton’s opinions on federal power, of course, were not always 
consistent with the views of his colleagues.6 But it would be deeply mistaken to 
discount his endorsement of commandeering. Hamilton was not trying to 
aggrandize federal power. Quite the opposite. He was offering a concession to 
those who feared greater centralized authority. After a bruising debate over 
federal power to collect tariffs—a controversy that had consumed continental 
politics for much of the 1780s—Hamilton was finally giving in. He was not 
about to repeat his prior political miscalculations, so he relented and gave the 
Anti-Federalists exactly what they wanted: an assurance that the federal 
government would commandeer state officers to enforce federal law. 
The idea of using state officers to enforce federal law emerged well before 
1787. While negotiations for an Anglo-American peace treaty were still ongoing 
in Europe, across the Atlantic a high-stakes controversy emerged over a 
proposal to amend the Articles of Confederation to give the Continental 
Congress the power to levy import duties on foreign goods. Proponents urged 
that the impost, as the tariff system was most commonly known, would 
provide the United States with revenue it desperately needed in order to repay 
its wartime debts. Leaders in Congress also recognized that collective-action 
failure plagued the existing system of state control over international trade 
regulations, thus limiting tariff revenues and preventing effective retaliation 
against onerous foreign duties and trade controls.7 
For these reasons, most politicians in the 1780s agreed that Congress 
should have authority to establish an impost. Yet when it came to deciding 
how to collect the tax, deep divisions emerged. The nation’s leading financial 
luminaries—Alexander Hamilton and Robert Morris—insisted on using 
“continental” officers accountable only to Congress. Others, though, worried 
that federal collectors would repeat the repressive colonial-era practices of their 
 
straightforward reading of the text suggests, however, that is not what Hamilton meant. See 
infra note 135. 
6.  Hamilton also was a shrewd politician who easily might have included a passage in The 
Federalist in hopes that it might someday reinforce his vision for a stronger national 
government. A particularly good example of such precedent setting is Hamilton’s support 
for an excise tax. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington (Aug. 18, 1792) 
(“[T]he authority of the National Government should be visible in some branch of internal 
Revenue; lest a total non-exercise of it should beget an impression that it was never to be 
exercised & next that it ought not to be exercised.”), in 12 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 228, 237 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1967).  
7.  See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 22, 1786) (“The necessity of 
harmony in the com[m]ercial regulations of the States has been rendered every day more 
apparent. The local efforts to counteract the policy of G[reat] B[ritain] instead of succeeding 
have in every instance recoiled more or less on the States which ventured on the trial.”), in 8 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 472, 476 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973). 
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British counterparts, who often failed to appreciate local circumstances and 
whose appointments were seen as feeding the contemptible appetite of a 
corrupt patronage system. Instead, these skeptics proposed giving Congress 
the power to collect import duties using only state officers. 
The dispute over how to collect the continental impost ultimately ended in 
gridlock, but its legacy endured, overshadowing much of the ratification 
process. The typical narrative of the Constitution’s genesis is that political 
affairs reached a crisis point, fatally undermining the Articles of Confederation 
and leading to vastly expanded, though still limited, federal powers. The 
impost story confirms this account in part, but it also calls for an important 
revision. With respect to the administration of federal law, rather than 
escalating their demands for greater federal power, Federalists framed the 
Constitution as conceding ground to the opponents of centralization. 
Particularly in the pivotal ratification contests in New York and Virginia, 
Federalists assured Convention delegates and the public that the federal 
government would generally rely on state officers rather than create new 
federal positions. And not lost in this debate was the premise that carried over 
from the impost controversy: federal duties would be legally binding. 
Anti-Federalist support for commandeering—a label not yet employed in 
the eighteenth century—continued into the First Congress, where the usual 
characters struggled over the pivotal issue of who would enforce federal law. 
Notwithstanding Federalist promises during ratification, however, the federal 
government placed very few federal responsibilities on state officers. 
Examining the causes of this apparent bait and switch reveals a largely untold 
story about the origins of the federal bureaucracy. Ironically, Anti-Federalists’ 
political miscalculations played a pivotal role in undermining their efforts to 
have state agents administer and enforce federal law. 
The current conception of the anticommandeering doctrine as a centerpiece 
of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution may make this account difficult 
to believe. Indeed, our conventional assumption that Anti-Federalists must have 
opposed commandeering is a central premise of one of the best scholarly articles 
on this topic. According to Michael Collins, Anti-Federalist support for 
commandeering would have contradicted “their usual rhetoric championing state 
and local prerogative against centralized power.”8 Commandeering is a type of 
centralized power, and thus “the absence of any outcry” from Anti-Federalists in 
opposition to commandeering, Collins asserts, “is itself strong evidence that such 
 
8.  Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 
WIS. L. REV. 39, 136. 
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a prospect was not part of the perceived message of The Federalist.”9 
Collins’s argument has intuitive appeal, but overwhelming historical 
evidence demonstrates that his conventional assumptions about Anti-Federalist 
attitudes are mistaken. Indeed, the prevailing historical account gets this 
important feature of the ratification story backward. Anti-Federalists were 
actually among the strongest supporters of commandeering both before and 
after ratification. Rather than considering duties imposed on state officials as 
contrary to federalism principles, many Anti-Federalists viewed the  
federal-administration issue through the prism of their recent colonial 
experience—an experience that had also heavily influenced debates over the 
continental impost. State officers were drawn from local communities and were 
sympathetic to local needs, whereas federal employees, like their British 
predecessors, would be unforgiving, unaccountable, and perhaps even 
tyrannical. Proponents of state power genuinely (though at times 
hyperbolically) feared that a burgeoning federal bureaucracy would quickly 
become a “swarm of harpies, who, under the denomination of revenue officers, 
[would] range through the country, prying into every man’s house and affairs, 
and like a Macedonian phalanx bear down all before them.”10 Limits on federal 
power existed largely to protect individual rights,11 and commandeering 
advanced that goal by making law enforcement more accountable to local 
interests. Furthermore, Anti-Federalists feared that the absence of a federal 
commandeering power would lead to a bloated federal patronage system, 
thereby shifting popular loyalties toward the federal government and slowly 
undermining the importance of state governments. 
Relying heavily on foundational assumptions about federal power 
supposedly underlying many Founding-era statements, prior scholars have 
offered conflicting accounts of the Founders’ attitudes about commandeering’s 
constitutionality. For instance, Sai Prakash argues that the Founders 
anticipated and accepted federal commandeering of state executive and judicial 
officers (though not state legislatures).12 He points in particular to Hamilton’s 
 
9.  Id. at 142. 
10.  2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1844 (1791) (remarks of Rep. Josiah Parker). 
11.  This point is recognized in Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011). 
12.  Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957, 1960 (1993) 
(“Though the Founding Generation did not wish to permit coercion of states in their 
sovereign, legislative capacities, many individuals envisioned federal commandeering of state 
executive officers. Apparently, they saw no inconsistency in abandoning federal 
commandeering of state legislatures while at the same time permitting federal 
commandeering of state executives.”); see also Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and 
Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers To Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. 
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and Madison’s assurances that the new federal government would rely on state 
officers, arguing that these promises implicitly embraced commandeering. 
Disagreeing, Michael Collins argues that Hamilton and Madison referred only 
to the federal use of state officers with state permission, and that 
commandeering was not part of the original constitutional design.13 His 
scholarship focuses primarily on federal commandeering of state judges,14 but 
most of his evidence and analysis applies equally to commandeering of state 
executive officers. 
This Article departs significantly from these prior studies. A substantial 
body of evidence not mentioned by Prakash and Collins focuses more directly 
on the issue of commandeering. The topic came up in a few early congressional 
debates, and it was also addressed in an 1802 federal circuit court opinion (long 
hidden in a Louisville archive) that is the only known Founding-era judicial 
opinion to squarely address the commandeering question presented in Printz v. 
United States.15 These sources provide a clearer picture of what many of  
the Founders thought about commandeering’s constitutionality. While  
Founding-era views were not unanimous, historical evidence strongly supports 
commandeering’s constitutionality. 
In addition to explaining what the Founders thought about 
commandeering, this Article also aims to reorient our understanding of how 
they approached the topic, including what they thought was at stake and which 
arguments they used to defend their views. For instance, the Oath Clause 
 
L. REV. 1001, 1046 (1995) (“[T]he Framers and early federal officials clearly contemplated 
interstitial enforcement of federal law by state executive as well as judicial officers.”); H. 
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 652-64 (1993) 
(discussing historical evidence about commandeering). This Article focuses on federal 
commandeering of state executive and judicial officers rather than of state legislators or 
legislatures, though I broach the latter issue briefly at the end of the Article. See infra note 
306. For an argument that historical evidence supports federal power to impose requisitions 
on state legislatures, see Erik M. Jensen & Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering, the Tenth 
Amendment, and the Federal Requisition Power: New York v. United States Revisited, 15 
CONST. COMMENT. 355 (1998). 
13.  Collins, supra note 8, at 136-37. 
14.  Collins’s primary concern is not whether commandeering falls within Article I powers but 
rather whether Article III creates an independent requirement that Congress create (and vest 
federal jurisdiction in) federal courts. See id. at 43. For more recent contributions to this 
interesting debate, see Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the  
Non-Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515 (2005); and James E. Pfander, Federal Supremacy, 
State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. 
L. REV. 191 (2007). See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 389-94 (6th ed. 2009). 
15.  521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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played a central yet unappreciated role in early debates about commandeering. 
Debates over financial compensation for state officials also offer revealing 
insights into Anti-Federalist support for commandeering. For example, 
perhaps the most persuasive modern critique of commandeering is that it 
would allow the federal government to impose administrative obligations 
without having to pay for them, thereby weakening political accountability. Yet 
Anti-Federalists seem not to have shared this concern. They instead worried 
that federal payments to state officers would render those officers reliant on 
federal income and would thus shift their loyalties away from state and local 
governments. Therefore, while many Anti-Federalists adamantly supported 
commandeering, they simultaneously took steps to ensure that the federal 
government would not pay for those additional burdens. 
Finally, the existing literature fails to appreciate the relatively quick shift in 
views about commandeering between the late 1780s and the early nineteenth 
century. Although explicit and implicit endorsements of commandeering were 
common during ratification, no one asserted that such a power would  
violate federalism principles. By the early nineteenth century, however, 
commandeering’s constitutionality was “liable to question, and [had], in fact, 
been seriously questioned” on exactly this ground.16 Thus, the early intellectual 
history of anticommandeering exemplifies the dynamic nature of constitutional 
law in the early republic and illustrates how the rapidly changing political 
climate of the 1790s enabled novel constitutional principles to supplant ideas 
that had been broadly accepted just a few years prior. Views about 
commandeering have remained unstable ever since. 
This Article is divided into four chronological parts. Part I describes the 
impost debates under the Articles of Confederation. When supporters of a 
stronger national government pushed for a new federal power to levy 
nationwide tariffs, a heated debate began over whether state or continental 
officers should collect the taxes. This controversy set the stage for the 
ratification showdown discussed in Part II, which reexamines the Federalists’ 
ratification promises. Part III turns to the earliest congressional debates about 
commandeering and describes the impact of state legislation on congressional 
decisionmaking. It also explores the earliest-known judicial opinion to examine 
commandeering. 
While federal power to commandeer state officers was generally accepted at 
the Founding, several factors combined in the late eighteenth and early 
 
16.  Lucius Crassus [Alexander Hamilton], The Examination No. VI, N.Y. EVENING POST, Jan. 2, 
1802, reprinted in 25 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 484, 488 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 
1977). 
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nineteenth centuries to make its constitutionality far more contested. And 
shifts in commandeering doctrine did not stop there. The Supreme Court 
explicitly rejected the constitutionality of commandeering in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, shifted gears in the twentieth century, and then returned to 
an anticommandeering approach during the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
revolution. Part IV explores these developments and considers how the 
historical evidence presented throughout this Article might impact our 
understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning. For those who privilege 
the Founders’ understandings of federalism principles or their intentions and 
expectations about how the Constitution would operate in practice, this 
account undermines the Court’s modern anticommandeering doctrine. At the 
very least, historical evidence suggests that commandeering of state executive 
and judicial officers should not be categorically unconstitutional. 
i .  confederation impost debates 
The Articles of Confederation had many vices, but when James Madison 
prepared his famous list in the spring of 1787, the inability of the continental 
government to raise revenue topped them all. The refusal of states to turn over 
the taxes demanded by the continental government, he wrote, “may be 
considered as not less radically and permanently inherent in, than it is fatal to 
the object of, the present System.”17 Indeed, the requisitions system had largely 
fallen apart, with most states lapsing on their obligatory payments18 and 
Congress failing to service many of its foreign debts.19 
As these defects emerged earlier in the decade, nationalists took swift 
action, pushing for a new congressional power to levy tariffs directly rather 
than relying on state legislatures for revenue. The idea of a federal impost 
power received broad support, but deep-seated divisions emerged over the 
proper method of collection. Nationalists insisted on hiring federal officers to 
collect the impost, but they met staunch (and ultimately unmovable) 
opposition. 
Given the horrendous condition of government finances, the impost 
 
17.  James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 348 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975). 
18.  See E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC 
FINANCE, 1776-1790, at 224-28 (1961); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson 
(Mar. 18, 1786) (“The payments from the States under the calls of Congress have in no year 
borne any proportion to the public wants.”), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 
7, at 500, 502. 
19.  See FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 234-35. 
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controversy became a defining issue in American politics. As Henry Knox later 
observed, “The insurrections of Massachusetts, and the opposition to the 
impost by New York, have been the corrosive means of rousing america to an 
attention to her liberties.”20 Although unmentioned in prior scholarship about 
commandeering, the impost controversy also formed the backdrop for 
subsequent ratification-era debates about federal use of state officers. 
A. The 1781 Impost Proposal 
Still in the midst of war, the Continental Congress formally requested in 
1781 that each state “vest a power in Congress, to levy” a tariff of five percent 
on many foreign imports.21 As Jack Rakove has noted, the proposal’s 
language—phrased as a constitutional guarantee of independent federal 
authority—was “apparently designed to obviate the possibility that the states 
could repeal their acts of authorization as they might any piece of legislation.”22 
Most histories of this episode recount that a majority of states quickly assented, 
with (in James Madison’s words) only the “obstinacy of Rhode Island” 
blocking the unanimous endorsement necessary to create a new congressional 
power under the Articles of Confederation.23 But this nationalist-driven 
narrative is only partly true.24 Some state legislatures quickly granted Congress 
 
20.  Letter from Henry Knox to Benjamin Lincoln (June 13, 1788), in 18 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 176, 177 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 
1995). The insurrection Knox refers to is now known as Shays’s Rebellion. 
21.  19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 112 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912). 
22.  JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 283 (1979). The 1783 impost proposal made that guarantee 
explicit. See 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 259 (Gaillard Hunt 
ed., 1922) (“[A]fter . . . unanimous accession . . . [the amendment] shall be considered as 
forming a mutual compact among all the states, and shall be irrevocable by any one or more 
of them without the concurrence of the whole, or of a majority of the United States in 
Congress assembled.”). 
23.  Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Nov. 26, 1782), in 5 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 328, 331 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1967). For 
one example of the blame placed on Rhode Island, see PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE 
PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788, at 11 (2010). On the necessity of unanimous 
consent, see JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 
1781-1788, at 73 (1961). 
24.  Federalists continued to blame Rhode Island long after the 1781 impost proposal’s defeat. 
See, e.g., One of the People, From the Pennsylvania Gazetteer to the Freemen of Pennsylvania, 
AM. HERALD, Nov. 5, 1787, at 1, 4 (“When Congress, at the conclusion of the war, 
recommended a duty of five per cent. the trifling state of Rhode-Island, whose extent is not 
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the power to appoint and supervise impost collectors, yet not all states were so 
generous.25 The method of collecting the impost proved controversial in many 
parts of the country, and impost supporters worried that bills moving through 
the various state legislatures might be “vitiated by the limitations with which 
they are clogged.”26 Massachusetts, for example, gave its own legislature the 
power to appoint impost collectors.27 Meanwhile, Connecticut’s legislature 
gave Congress authority to appoint collectors, but it also made them “liable to 
be suspended or removed from said office in case of misconduct therein by this 
Assembly.”28 Georgia’s legislature chose not even to address the impost until 
1783, at which point it voted by a wide margin to postpone further 
consideration of the idea until the next session.29 
Objections to the impost varied, but as the conditions imposed by 
Massachusetts and Connecticut suggest, a common theme was that 
congressional power to appoint and supervise federal collectors might give way 
to tyranny and corruption. In a letter to Congress justifying its rejection of the 
 
greater than one of our counties, refused their acquiescence, and this prevented a measure 
most beneficial to these states . . . .”). 
25.  The best summary of the impost controversy remains MAIN, supra note 23, at 72-102. For 
early state authorizations, see LINDA GRANT DE PAUW, THE ELEVENTH PILLAR: NEW YORK 
STATE AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 33 (1966), which cites New York’s 1781 approval of 
federal duties “under such penalties and regulations, and by such officers, as Congress 
should from time to time make, order, and appoint” (quoting 1 DEALVA STANWOOD 
ALEXANDER, A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 24 (1906)); and James 
Madison, Notes on Debates (Jan. 28, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 141, 152 n.29 
(William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969). The initial 1781 proposal did 
not specify who would administer the collection, but the following year Congress prepared a 
draft ordinance that specified “that there shall be an officer appointed and commissioned by 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, for each of the confederate States, who 
shall be called the Collector of the customs, and shall be an Inhabitant and Citizen of the 
State for which he shall be appointed.” Draft Ordinance for the Impost of 1781, in 6 THE 
PAPERS OF ROBERT MORRIS, 1781-1784, at 683, 690 (John Catanzariti & E. James Ferguson 
eds., 1984). The proposal also mentioned the collectors’ “deputies, clerks and servants.” Id. 
26.  Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (July 2, 1782), in 4 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 386, 387 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1965). 
27.  John Catanzariti & E. James Ferguson, Foreword to Draft Ordinance for the Impost of 1781, 
supra note 25, at 684 (citing ACTS AND LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, 
1780-1781, at 590-91 (1890)). Under the Massachusetts law, Congress could have appointed 
its own agents if the state legislature received notice of vacancies but failed to fill them 
within fifteen days. Id. 
28.  An Act To Vest in the Congress of the United States a Power To Levy Certain Duties in This 
State and for Appropriating the Same (Feb. 1781), reprinted in 3 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT 314 (Charles J. Headly ed., 1922). 
29.  MAIN, supra note 23, at 96-97; 3 THE REVOLUTIONARY RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 
274-75 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1908). 
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impost, Rhode Island’s legislature explained that “the recommendation 
proposed to introduce into [Rhode Island] and the other states, officers 
unknown and unaccountable to them, and so is against the constitution of this 
State.”30 A writer in Massachusetts concurred, warning that nationalists were 
trying to prevent “the same persons that collect the State taxes” from also 
collecting federal revenue. If “the collectors of the Continental tax must not be 
the civil officers of the State, but the officers of Congress,” the writer warned, states 
would be forced to “shamefully submit to [tax collection] by collectors, whom 
the Congress, or the minister of Congress, or the deputy of the minister shall 
be pleased to appoint.”31 Similar worries cropped up in Virginia, where in 
October 1782 the legislature rescinded its previous approval of the impost.32 
Arriving later to the scene in Richmond, Edmund Pendleton reported “a fix’d 
Aversion in some Gent[lemen] to putting an independent Revenue into the 
hands of Congress, which say they, is necessary for no other purpose than to 
give them the appointment of a number of Officers dependent on them, [and] 
so to gain an undue Influence in the States.”33 In light of these objections, 
Rhode Island Congressman David Howell remarked that the impost would be 
more palatable if “each state retain[ed] the power of choosing the officers of 
the revenue to be collected within its jurisdiction.”34 
Skepticism about centralized appointments was nothing new; indeed, 
critiques of the corrupt British political system had often focused on the 
 
30.  23 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 788 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914); 
see also [David Howell], Thoughts on the Five Per Cent., PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, Oct. 19, 1782 
(“What can we promise ourselves [when taxes are] assessed upon us, to be collected by 
strangers . . . ?”). For a summary of the debates in Rhode Island, see IRWIN H. POLISHOOK, 
RHODE ISLAND AND THE UNION, 1774-1795, at 53-101 (1969). For a concise summary of 
Howell’s other objections, see Objections to the Impost in Rhode Island from David 
Howell, July/Aug. 1782, in 6 THE PAPERS OF ROBERT MORRIS, 1781-1784, supra note 25, at 
113, 113-15. 
31.  Argus, NEW-ENG. CHRON., Apr. 26, 1782, at 2. 
32.  See An Act To Repeal the Act, Intituled, An Act To Enable the Congress of the United States 
To Levy a Duty on Certain Goods and Merchandizes, and Also on All Prizes (Oct. 1782), 
reprinted in 11 STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 171 
(Richmond, William Waller Hening ed., 1823). 
33.  Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (May 4, 1783), in 7 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 12, 12 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1971). Interestingly, 
Patrick Henry—a leading proponent of states’ rights—was apparently not among those who 
worried about federal collectors, jesting instead that states might eliminate “the danger of 
introducing continental officers for the collection of the impost . . . by drawing the teeth and 
cutting the nails of the officers.” Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (May 15, 
1783), in 7 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra, at 44, 45. 
34.  See POLISHOOK, supra note 30, at 84. 
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monarchy’s patronage power. As Gordon Wood has observed, Americans 
thought that the power to appoint officers was “the dynamo that converted 
royal energy into effective, although subtle, governmental power,”35 and thus 
constituted “the most insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth-century 
despotism.”36 Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, for instance, described the  
“self-evident” fact that the Crown “derives its whole consequence merely from 
being the giver of places and pensions.”37 “[T]hough we have been wise 
enough to shut and lock a door against absolute Monarchy,” Paine colorfully 
opined, “we at the same time have been foolish enough to put the Crown in 
possession of the key.”38 Corrupt royal patronage was also on the Declaration 
of Independence’s list of grievances.39 “The royal governors, as the Crown’s 
vicegerents,” Wood explains, “had continually sought to use their authority as 
the source of honor and privilege in the community to build webs of influence 
that could match those in effect in England.”40 Of course, the number of 
appointments was limited, but the monarchy exercised its power to maximum 
effect, especially by granting lucrative and prestigious posts to influential 
citizens.41 The colonists had also complained that royal patronage led to 
appointments of officers from outside the community who failed to appreciate 
local circumstances and who were more likely to commit abuses.42 No wonder 
state legislatures were apprehensive about unleashing a newly minted corps of 
 
35.  GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 144 (2d ed. 
1998). 
36.  Id. at 143. 
37.  THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in 1 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 69, 
74 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1906). 
38.  Id. 
39.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 12 (U.S. 1776) (complaining that King George III 
had “erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our 
people, and eat out their substance”). This grievance may have been directed particularly at 
the appointment of trade officials. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 110 (1997) (suggesting that the grievance “was probably 
prompted by the American Board of Customs Commissioners, which was located in Boston, 
and its dependents—clerks, surveyors, tide waiters and the like—whom the Bible-reading 
folk of Massachusetts considered much like an Old Testament plague of locusts”). However, 
the colonists had often decried all sorts of royal appointments. See WOOD, supra note 35, at 
33, 42, 77-79, 111, 143-48. 
40.  WOOD, supra note 35, at 145. 
41.  Id. at 146-47. 
42.  See, e.g., DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE 122-33 (2005) (discussing the 
struggle between centralized royal control and so-called “creole” local control in New York). 
Notably, the impost proposal guaranteed the appointment of in-state collectors. See supra 
note 25. 
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continental officers to administer the impost. “Such fears,” Jack Rakove 
observes, “were directly evocative of the convictions that had led the Americans 
into revolution.”43 
B. The 1783 Compromise 
Faced with the defeat of their 1781 proposal, supporters of the impost 
initially held fast to the idea of using only federally appointed and supervised 
collectors. “The United States have a common interest in an uniform and 
equally energetic collection,” Congress explained in its formal reply to Rhode 
Island.44 Appointing federal officers was therefore “an essential part” of the 
program, without which “it might in reality operate as a very unequal tax.”45 
Rhode Island’s legislature, however, refused to reconsider its decision.46 
Resuming their efforts in 1783, delegates in the Continental Congress 
agreed that it was “indispensibly necessary to the restoration of public credit, 
and to the punctual and honorable discharge of the public debts” to provide 
Congress “with a power to levy for the use of the United States” a system of 
import duties.47 Again, though, the choice of how to collect the impost proved 
contentious. Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut, for example, “expressed a strong 
dislike to a collection by officers appointed under Congress & supposed the 
States would never be brought to consent to it.”48 Robert Morris, the 
Confederation’s Superintendent of Finance, offered a lengthy rebuttal. “[I]t is 
indispensable that all the Collectors be appointed by the authority of the United 
States,” he urged, primarily because “[e]xperience has shewn that Taxes 
heretofore laid in the States have not been collected.” Employing tax collectors 
who “consider the Circumstances of the People” when performing their duties, 
Morris argued, would condone “favor and Partiality.” In fact, the independence 
of federal collectors from local pressures was “the strongest Reason why the 
 
43.  RAKOVE, supra note 22, at 315. 
44.  Report on a Letter from the Speaker of the Rhode Island Assembly (Dec. 16, 1782), in 3 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 213, 217 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).  
45.  Id. 
46.  POLISHOOK, supra note 30, at 86-93.  
47.  24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 257 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922). 
48.  James Madison, Notes on Debates (Jan. 27, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 133, 
136 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969); see also Madison, supra 
note 25, at 142 (noting that Congress reserved the issue of whether the impost would be 
“collected under the authority of Congress”). 
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Collectors should be appointed by and amenable to Congress.”49 
Alexander Hamilton offered an additional rationale for making tax 
collectors accountable only to Congress. According to Madison’s notes on the 
congressional debates, Hamilton “signified that as the energy of the federal 
Govt. was evidently short of the degree necessary for pervading & uniting the 
States it was expedient to introduce the influence of officers deriving their 
emoluments from & consequently interested in supporting the power of, 
Congress.”50 In other words, Hamilton thought that congressional 
appointments would serve as the basis for a federal patronage system, thus 
spawning a nationwide network of individuals loyal to Congress. This proposal 
was quite audacious given the staunch colonial opposition to royal 
appointments. Madison wryly commented in his notes that Hamilton’s remark 
was “imprudent & injurious to the cause . . . it was meant to serve.”51 After all, 
the prospect of a federal patronage system, Madison wrote, “was the very 
source of jealousy which rendered the States averse to a revenue under the 
collection as well as appropriation of Congress. All the members of Congress 
who concurred in any degree with the States in this jealousy smiled at the 
disclosure.”52 Madison’s colleagues from Virginia commented privately that 
“Mr. Hamilton had let out the secret.”53 
Hamilton’s speech was imprudent, but it hardly should have been 
surprising. As one scholar writes, Hamilton “repeatedly insisted on the 
necessity of creating among the nation’s leadership a class of influentials tied to 
the federal government and capable of counterbalancing the influentials 
currently tied to the states.”54 Just the previous summer, for instance, Hamilton 
had written in a New York newspaper that “[t]he reason of allowing Congress 
to appoint its own officers of the customs, collectors of taxes, and military 
officers of every rank, is to create in the interior of each state a mass of 
influence in favour of the Fœderal Government.”55 The weakness of the 
 
49.  Letter from Robert Morris to Elias Boudinot, President of Congress (Mar. 8, 1783), in 7 THE 
PAPERS OF ROBERT MORRIS 513, 527 (John Catanzariti et al. eds., 1988). Morris also argued 
that it was “a Kind of Absurdity . . . that Congress should have a Right to the Tax and yet no 
Right to send their Servants to receive it.” Id. 
50.  Madison, supra note 25, at 143. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. 
53.  Id. 
54.  Lance Banning, James Madison and the Nationalists, 1780-1783, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 227, 248 
(1983). 
55.  [Alexander Hamilton], The Continentalist No. VI, N.Y. PACKET, July 4, 1782, reprinted in 3 
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 99, 105 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). 
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Confederation government, he argued, made it imprudent to worry that 
Congress “will ever become formidable to the general liberty.”56 These views, 
as well as their frosty reception in Congress, later informed Hamilton’s strategy 
during ratification. 
In the end, though, Congress rejected Hamilton’s uncompromising 
position and recommended that “the collectors of the said duties shall be 
appointed by the states, within which their offices are to be respectively 
exercised, but when so appointed, shall be amendable to, and removable by  
the United States in Congress assembled, alone.”57 In making this  
proposal—widely known as the Impost of 1783—Congress noted that it had 
“not been unmindful of the objections which heretofore frustrated the 
unanimous adoption” of the 1781 impost plan. “If the strict maxims of national 
credit alone were to be consulted,” the delegates explained, collection of the 
revenue would have been placed entirely under the authority of Congress.58 
Neither side was particularly happy with the compromise. Hamilton, who 
along with Madison had been on the committee that drafted the proposal, 
voted in protest against it. Although he urged New York’s legislature to accept 
the compromise, Hamilton also worried privately that “it will in a great 
measure fail in the execution.”59 Meanwhile, Rhode Island’s delegates reported 
back to their governor: “It would have been less exceptionable to us, had the 
Officers for collecting the Revenues been under the Controul as well as the 
 
56.  Id. 
57.  24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 258 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1922). 
The proposal also provided that “in case any State shall not make such appointment within 
one month after notice given for that purpose, the appointment may be made by the United 
States in Congress assembled.” Id. 
58.  Id. at 278. 
59.  DE PAUW, supra note 25, at 33-34. When the delegates originally voted for this compromise 
on February 12, 1783, the New York and Pennsylvania delegations dissented, probably 
because Hamilton and James Wilson had been pushing for the collectors to be federal 
appointees. See James Madison, Notes on Debates (Feb. 12, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 225-26, 227 n.15 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969). 
About a month later, Hamilton and Wilson jointly moved 
to strike out the clauses relative to the appointment of Collectors, and to provide 
that the Collectors shd be inhabitants of the States within which they sd. collect; 
should be nominated by Congs. and appointed by the States, and in case such 
nomination should not be accepted or rejected within {blank} days it should 
stand good. 
  James Madison, Notes on Debates (Mar. 11, 1783), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 322, 
323 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1969). The motion barely failed 
by a vote of “5 ays & 6 noes.” Id. 
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Appointment of the State . . . .”60 Nevertheless, they suggested that “a 
Deviation so far as relates to the Controul of the Officers may be made [by the 
state legislature], with a probability of its being acquiesced in by Congress.”61 
C. Defeat in New York 
Although Congress had reached a compromise, the proposal still needed 
unanimous state approval. This time around, the stiffest opposition came from 
New York, though again modern scholars have generally adopted the 
Federalist narrative and overlooked the substantial diversity of opinion in other 
states.62 Signs of trouble in New York were apparent from the outset. In March 
1783, just a month before announcement of the new proposal, New York’s 
assembly rejected by a single vote a bill to curtail the state’s prior endorsement 
of the 1781 plan. The narrowly defeated measure would have given the state 
veto power over congressional appointments of revenue officers assigned to 
work in New York.63 
Leading the charge against the federal impost power was Abraham Yates, 
Jr.64—a vocal supporter of New York’s powerful governor, George Clinton. In 
a series of publications, Yates raised the specter of a large federal bureaucracy, 
including “all the collectors, deputy collectors, comptrollers, clerks,  
tide-waiters, and searchers, for the collection and after management of a vast 
revenue.”65 Why was a large federal bureaucracy so inherently dangerous? 
 
60.  Letter from the R.I. Delegates to William Greene, Gov. of R.I. (Apr. 23, 1783), in 7 LETTERS 
OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 147, 147 (Edmund C. Burnett ed., 1934). 
61.  Id. at 148. 
62.  For summaries of the 1783 impost controversy, see FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 165-67,  
220-42; MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING 
THE CONFEDERATION, 1781-1789, at 407-21 (1950); JOHN P. KAMINSKI, GEORGE CLINTON: 
YEOMAN POLITICIAN OF THE NEW REPUBLIC 89-96 (1993); and MAIN, supra note 23, at  
72-102. 
63.  MAIN, supra note 23, at 98. 
64.  See DE PAUW, supra note 25, at 35, 42. Yates had been previously overlooked for an 
appointment as a continental receiver, which “may have helped to convert Yates into a 
militant opponent of further congressional powers.” RAKOVE, supra note 22, at 310. 
Whatever Yates’s own motives, opposition to federal collectors was conventional and 
prevailed in several state legislatures during the 1780s. 
65.  [Abraham Yates], A Rough Hewer, Advocates for a Congressional Revenue in the State of 
 New-York (Mar. 17, 1785), in POLITICAL PAPERS, ADDRESSED TO THE ADVOCATES FOR A 
CONGRESSIONAL REVENUE 5 (New York, S. Kollock 1786); see also A Countryman, CONN. 
GAZETTE & UNIVERSAL INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 22, 1782, at 2 (“True, say they, it must lie 
entirely with Congress what number of officers of the customs (sufficient to guard every 
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Yates tied his argument to the recent colonial opposition to British revenue 
agents. “The power of collecting and managing the British revenues, . . . being 
vested in the crown,” he observed, “has proved a source of corruption, and a 
means of extending the influence of prerogative; and however unquestionable 
the virtue of our present rulers, are they not men? . . . Will not a court interest 
soon be created and intriguing and caballing for offices ensue [under the new 
government]?”66 “[T]rusting the means of undue influence and inordinate 
power in the hands of Congress,” another commenter admonished, “will be 
productive of the same consequences as we have seen in Great-Britain.”67 
For Yates, the 1783 compromise was insufficient to calm these fears. Simply 
giving states the “pitiful privilege” of appointing federal revenue officers, he 
argued, “is too thin a covering to deceive even children in politics. If they are 
only accountable to Congress, they are only the servants of that body: After a 
man has climbed the ladder of preferment, he kicks it down as no longer 
useful.”68 In other words, so long as Congress had the power to fire revenue 
officers, those officers would effectively be congressional agents. Yates also 
warned that merchants would thereafter be “subjected to the power and caprice 
of every petty officer of the customs; and over whom neither yourselves nor 
your state will have any controul; for they are to be amendable to Congress 
only.”69 In a revealing passage, he then asked rhetorically: “How degrading this 
idea to a sovereign and independent state?”70 
Opponents of the impost were not united in offering a counterproposal, 
 
river, creek, bay or inlet, in a coast nearly 2000 miles in length) and pensioners shall be 
supported upon the duties proposed . . . .”). 
66.  Yates, supra note 65, at 6; see also Casca, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Oct. 11, 1783, 
at 1 (remarking that the British tax collection system was “the parent of corruption—the 
power and prevailing instrument of pernicious influence, in the supreme executive power”); 
Remarks and Observations on the Articles of Confederation of the Thirteen United States of  
North-America. No. II., AM. MERCURY (Hartford, Conn.), Oct. 11, 1784, at 2 (“[I]ncreasing 
the number of placemen and pensioners, tends to enlarge the powers of government beyond 
their proper bounds and to render them sovereign, arbitrary, and dispotic.”). 
67.  Casca, supra note 66, at 1. 
68.  Yates, supra note 65, at 15; see also A Republican, To the Public, N.Y. J., Oct. 12, 1786 
(suggesting that when collectors “exceed or abuse their authority,” the provision making 
them amendable to Congress alone might leave them free from suit); Dixit Senex, The Plain 
Dealer, No. XI, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., May 10, 1783, at 1 (“The pitiful 
privilege of appointing Collectors, who are to be amenable only to Congress, will afford little 
security to the States against the abuse of office; it will rather be an aggravation to be insulted 
by creatures of our own make, after it is not in our power to unmake them; for my own part, 
I never wish for the power of raising devils I have not the power of laying.”). 
69.   Yates, supra note 65, at 16. 
70.  Id. at 16. 
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but they did agree that additional federal power was needed and should include 
commandeering of some sort.71 Following the usual practice under the Articles 
of Confederation, George Clinton apparently thought that Congress should 
use requisitions—that is, legally binding demands that state legislatures turn 
over impost revenue.72 Understandably, this view was not widely endorsed. As 
Alexander Hamilton later remarked in Federalist No. 15, “though in theory 
[congressional] resolutions . . . are laws, constitutionally binding on the 
members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations, which 
the States observe or disregard at their option.”73 Another idea was to give the 
Continental Congress the power to impose duties on state officers directly, 
thus making those officers (contrary to the 1783 compromise) not federal 
officers dependent on Congress “alone” but rather state officers with federal 
duties.74 But nobody seems to have fleshed out how Congress might ensure 
compliance from uncooperative state officers, and ensuring compliance from 
uncooperative states was a perilous endeavor.75 Still, opponents of the 1783 
 
71.  See, e.g., MAIN, supra note 23, at 101 (“[O]pposition was not so much to an impost as to the 
impost—in the form recommended and insisted upon by Congress.”). 
72.  New York Ratification Convention Debates and Proceedings (June 28, 1788) (remarks of 
Gov. George Clinton) (“I believed that granting the revenue, without giving the power of 
collection or a controul over our state officers, would be the most wise and prudent 
measure.”), reprinted in 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1976, 1980 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008). Hamilton later decried 
Clinton’s position on the impost as “a subterfuge.” Alexander Hamilton, H. G. Letter No. 
VII (Feb. 28, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 277, 277 (Harold C. 
Syrett ed., 1962). “To oppose . . . the specific plan offered, and yet pretend to be a friend to 
the thing in the abstract,” Hamilton wrote, “deserves no better name than that of 
hypocrisy.” Id at 277-78. Yates perceived a state constitutional bar against “delegat[ing]” or 
“transfer[ring]” legislative power to Congress. See [Abraham Yates], Rough Hewer III, N.Y. 
GAZETTEER, Oct. 20, 1783, at 19. This non-delegation concern stemmed from a view that 
sovereignty ultimately rested in the people themselves, not state governments. See WOOD, 
supra note 35, at 362. The Framers famously avoided this problem by vesting the ratification 
power in the people themselves of each state, thus making the Constitution a pact among 
“We the People” as well as among the states. 
73.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 1, at 93 (Alexander Hamilton). 
74.  For the reference to supervision by Congress “alone,” see supra note 57 and accompanying 
text. For an example of support for a federally mandated duty administered by state officers, 
see infra note 87 and accompanying text. See also Remarks and Observations on the Articles of 
Confederation of the Thirteen United States of North-America. No. II., supra note 66, at 2 (“Will 
a collector of duties . . . be vested with more ample powers; if appointed by, or made 
amenable to Congress, and removable by their authority . . . than if appointed by our 
honourable Assembly . . . ?”). 
75.  Confederation-era and Founding-era debates did, however, often mention prophylactic 
remedies the continental government might use with respect to noncompliant state 
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impost proposal thought that state sovereignty militated in favor of 
commandeering, thereby avoiding the need for potentially intrusive federal 
officers. That priority is hardly surprising, though, given that commandeering 
of state legislatures was the default means of exercising many continental 
powers under the Articles of Confederation. 
New York faced the ire of the cosmopolitan press, but some New Yorkers 
were incredulous that their efforts to secure a state-based collection system 
were being labeled obstructionist. In an extended essay originally printed in the 
New-York Journal, one writer pointed out that “the acts passed by the several 
states, in consequence of the [congressional] recommendation, vary as much 
from each other as from the terms of the resolutions upon which they are 
founded.”76 Indeed, states had limited their authorization bills in various 
ways.77 New Jersey, for instance, withheld congressional power to make 
appointments if the state refused.78 Meanwhile, the three southernmost states 
prohibited impost collectors from holding other state or federal positions.79 
And most state authorization bills either included a detailed list of protected 
individual rights80 (most of which later appeared in the Federal Bill of Rights) 
or simply ensured, in the words of Maryland’s bill, that the “ordinances, 
regulations and arrangements” that Congress found “proper or necessary for 
the faithful and punctual payment and collection of the said duties” must “not 
 
legislatures. See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of Union, 123 
HARV. L. REV. 1817, 1839-62 (2010). 
76.  A Republican, supra note 68. This essay was reprinted in a pamphlet by “a number of 
Friends to Liberty and Government.” See THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS OF THE 18TH OF 
APRIL, 1783: RECOMMENDING THE STATES TO INVEST CONGRESS WITH THE POWER TO LEVY 
AN IMPOST FOR THE USE OF THE STATES; AND THE LAWS OF THE RESPECTIVE STATES, PASSED 
IN PURSUANCE OF THE SAID RECOMMENDATION 50-63 (New York, Carroll & Patterson 1787) 
[hereinafter RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS].  
77.  The various state authorization bills were helpfully collected in RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS, 
supra note 76. 
78.  Id. at 22. 
79.  Id. at 42 (North Carolina); id. at 45 (South Carolina); id. at 48 (Georgia). 
80.  Id. at 7 (New Hampshire); id. at 10 (Massachusetts); id. at 13 (Rhode Island); id. at 31 
(Pennsylvania); id. at 40 (Virginia); id. at 44 (South Carolina); id. at 48 (Georgia). 
Interestingly, all seven of these authorization bills included an explicit warrant requirement 
for searches of buildings. Contra Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 757, 763 (1994) (“[A]lthough many [state constitutions] featured language 
akin to the Fourth Amendment, none had a textual warrant requirement. . . . Nor have 
proponents of a warrant requirement uncovered even a handful of clear [Founding-era] 
statements of the ‘requirement’ . . . .”). 
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be repugnant to the constitution of this state.”81 
New York’s legislature eventually granted Congress the power to levy an 
impost, but the state’s acceptance was contingent on amendments widely 
acknowledged to “render it inadmissible by Congress.”82 In particular, the 
legislature stipulated that it would maintain supervision over the collectors, 
and that duties collected within New York would be payable in the state’s 
paper currency.83 According to a congressional committee’s evaluation, the sole 
authority of Congress to supervise collectors “must be considered as an 
essential part of the plan.”84 Failure to provide that authority would “destroy 
the equality of the tax, and might, in a great measure, defeat the revenue.”85 
Therefore, the committee resolved that New York’s nominal acceptance “so 
essentially varies from the system of impost recommended by the United States 
in Congress . . . that the said act is not, and cannot be considered as a 
compliance with the same.”86 
In 1787, Alexander Hamilton joined the New York Assembly and 
spearheaded what became the final effort to approve the impost under the 
Articles of Confederation. On February 15, by a single-vote majority, the 
 
81.  RESOLUTIONS OF CONGRESS, supra note 76, at 37. Delaware similarly gave Congress the 
power to pass “necessary and expedient” rules and ordinances “not repugnant to the 
constitution and laws of this state.” Id. at 32. These bills and their conditions offer a useful 
reminder that the impost proposal was not isolated to tax collection but also encompassed 
the related implied powers to enforce the collection through various means, such as the 
creation of federal courts or the use of state courts. 
82.  Letter from Henry Lee, Jr. to George Washington (Apr. 21, 1786), in 4 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: CONFEDERATION SERIES 26 (W.W. Abbott et al. eds., 1995). 
83.  See An Act for Giving and Granting to the United States in Congress Assembled, Certain 
Imposts and Duties on Foreign Goods Imported into this State, for the Special Purpose of 
Paying the Principal and Interest of the Debt Contracted in the Prosecution of the Late War 
with Great Britain (May 4, 1786), reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 320-22 
(Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1886); see also KAMINSKI, supra note 62, at 92 (discussing 
New York’s 1786 impost bill). 
84.  31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 532 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1934). 
85.  Id. The committee report noted that New York’s impost bill 
does not make the collectors of the said duties amendable to and removable by the 
United States in Congress assembled; but ordains, that upon conviction [in New 
York state court] . . . for any default or neglect in the execution of the duties 
required of them . . . they shall be removed from office . . . which is a material 
departure from the plan recommended by Congress. 
  Id. at 533. 
86.  Id. at 534. 
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assembly gave Congress the power to levy an impost.87 Yet again, however, the 
legislature refused to turn over sole authority to supervise the collectors. In 
fact, the assembly rejected by a vote of thirty-eight to nineteen a proposal to 
make the collectors “accountable to, and removeable by the United States in 
Congress assembled.”88 Hamilton vehemently protested. All the other states 
that had accepted the 1783 compromise, he argued, were “conscious of energy 
in their own administration” and would refuse to accept a plan “which left the 
collection of the duties in the hands of each state, and of course subject to all 
the inequalities which a more or less vigorous system of collection would 
produce.”89 “If any state should incline to evade the payment of the duties, 
having the collection in its own hands,” he warned, “nothing would be easier 
than to effect it, and without materially sacrificing appearances.”90 Hamilton’s 
comments were impassioned but ultimately unavailing. Following his speech, 
New York’s assemblymen again rejected the 1783 compromise, this time by a 
vote of thirty-six to twenty-one.91 
National leaders had reached a precipice. Before the impost’s final defeat, 
the central government had already become imperiled. “Congress have kept the 
Vessel from sinking,” Madison remarked to Jefferson in 1785, “but it has been 
by standing constantly at the pump, not by stopping the leaks which have 
endangered her.”92 “The failure of the impost coupled with the dissolution of 
the public debt,” James Ferguson writes, “seemed to portend an immediate and 
perhaps final decline of the central government.”93 And along with that demise, 
Madison feared, would go the fate of the American democratic experiment. 
The “unfavorable balance” of trade stemming from the “anarchy of our 
commerce,” he explained in 1786, had prompted an exodus of hard currency, 
thus furnishing “pretexts for the pernicious substitution of paper money, for 
indulgences to debtors, for postponements of taxes. In fact most of our 
political evils may be traced up to our commercial ones, as most of our moral 
 
87.  JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 51 (New York, Samuel & John 
Loudon 1787). 
88.  Id. at 52. 
89.  Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act Granting to Congress Certain Imposts and Duties 
(Feb. 15, 1787), reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 71, 88 (Harold C. Syrett 
ed., 1962). 
90.  Id. 
91.  JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, supra note 87, at 52. 
92.  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 3, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 7, at 373. 
93.  FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 242. 
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may to our political.”94 In no uncertain terms, the young Republic was in 
crisis. 
i i .  the constitution 
As events unfolded, Federalists adeptly used the national crisis to their 
advantage, pushing for a broad reform agenda that culminated in a sweeping 
proposal to replace the Articles of Confederation. After the failure of the impost 
plan, delegates from every state except Rhode Island gathered in Philadelphia, 
ostensibly to propose amendments to the Articles of Confederation. Records 
from the Constitutional Convention are mostly silent with respect to 
commandeering of state executive and judicial officers, but a couple of rejected 
proposals mentioned the idea. The New Jersey Plan, for instance, called for 
bringing certain federal cases in “the Common law Judiciarys of the State in 
which any offence . . . shall have been committed.”95 Roger Sherman 
apparently drafted a separate proposal that “the laws of the United States 
ought, as far as may be consistent with the common interests of the Union, to 
be carried into execution by the judiciary and executive officers of the 
respective states, wherein the execution thereof is required.”96 These proposals 
were undoubtedly meant to appease skeptics who were worried about 
expanding the size of the federal government. In the end, however, the 
convention delegates left for future Congresses to decide what means were 
“necessary and proper” for administering federal laws.97 As Jerry Mashaw 
notes, “The Constitution provided a legislature, a Supreme Court, and two 
 
94.  Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Mar. 18, 1786), supra note 18, at 502. 
95.  James Madison, Notes on the Ratification Convention Debates (June 15, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 242, 243 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
96.  Sherman’s Proposals, in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 615, 616 
(Max Farrand ed., 1937). Justice O’Connor cited this document in her majority opinion in 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 164-65 (1992). Sherman may have offered this 
proposal at the convention in mid-July. See THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 71 n.32 (1993). 
97.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. On several occasions, the delegates debated whether the states 
should have a role in appointing federal officers, but none of these discussions mentions 
commandeering. See, e.g., James Madison, Notes on the Ratification Convention Debates 
(Aug. 23, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 95, at 
384, 387-88; James Madison, Notes on the Ratification Convention Debates (Aug. 24, 1787), 
in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 95, at 400, 405-06. 
Other discussions touched on legislative requisitions. See Clark, supra note 75, at 1843-53. 
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executive officers. Administration was missing.”98 
Though little discussed in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, the topic of 
federal administration came up often during the ratification debates. The 
typical narrative of the Constitution’s genesis is one of Federalist advancement, 
with Hamilton and Madison consistently advocating for greater federal power. 
Anti-Federalist assemblymen framed the debate in this way from the very 
outset of the ratification contest. The rhetorical jousting started when a group 
of Anti-Federalists dramatically boycotted the Pennsylvania legislative session 
in an effort to deny the legislature a quorum and thus block the delegates from 
convening a ratification convention.99 Repeating an argument they had won 
several times before, the absentee legislators explained to their constituents: 
“You can . . . best determine . . . whether a continental collector assisted by a 
few faithful soldiers will be more eligible than your present collectors of 
taxes.”100 But Federalists did not take the bait. As they set out from 
Philadelphia to sell their new proposal to the public, Federalists retreated in an 
important way, consistently arguing that the Framers had adopted the basic 
Anti-Federalist position with respect to the administration of federal law. The 
impost controversy, in other words, critically shaped the subsequent 
ratification-era debates about federal use of state officers. 
A. Ratification Debates 
Shortly after the Constitutional Convention adjourned, publishers began 
printing a series of essays opposing ratification. Federalists labeled the authors 
of these essays Anti-Federalists—a term they intended to be disparaging.101 
These Anti-Federalist writers were generally opposed to the proposed 
constitution—at least without amendments—but they were by no means a 
homogenous or cohesive group.102 Nonetheless, common themes run through 
 
98.  Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 
115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1266 (2006). 
99.  See MAIER, supra note 23, at 63-64. 
100.  An Address of the Subscribers Members of the Late House of Representatives of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Sept. 29, 1787), in 3 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 11, 15 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). Some scholars have framed the 
ratification contest in the same way. See, e.g., HULSEBOSCH, supra note 42, at 221 (“The 
primary theme of the ratification debate was simple: Who would rule and where? . . . The 
Federalists hoped to create a cosmopolitan, interstate governing class, which they thought 
possible only with strong federal institutions.”). 
101.  See MAIER, supra note 23, at 92-95. 
102.  See id. 
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many of their writings. Given the earlier opposition to the impost under the 
Articles of Confederation, it is no surprise that the administration of federal 
law quickly emerged as a major rallying point for Anti-Federalist opposition. 
Anti-Federalists frequently volleyed attacks on the federal power to lay and 
collect taxes, a power they said would lead to an oppressive cadre of federal 
collectors. An author who used the pseudonym Brutus—perhaps New York 
politician Robert Yates,103 who was the nephew of New York’s leading 
opponent of the impost, Abraham Yates—warned that the “great latitude” of 
the power to lay and collect taxes “opens a door to the appointment of a swarm 
of revenue and excise officers to pray [sic] upon the honest and industrious 
part of the community.”104 “[I]t will be the policy of this government to 
multiply officers in every department,” the dissenters at Pennsylvania’s 
ratification convention explained, and therefore “judges, collectors,  
tax-gatherers, excisemen and the whole host of revenue officers will swarm 
over the land, devouring the hard earnings of the industrious. Like the locusts 
of old, impoverishing and desolating all before them.”105 Anti-Federalists 
particularly worried that nationally appointed collectors would abuse their 
positions with impunity, seeking safe haven in federal courts.106 
 
103.  For discussions of the authorship of the Brutus essays, see 2 THE COMPLETE  
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 358; 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 411 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1981); and 
Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb, Introduction to THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF 
THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, at xi, xxi-xxix (Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb eds., 
2009).  
104.  Brutus No. V, N.Y. J., Dec. 13, 1787, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 100, at 388, 390 (alteration in original). As the backdrop for much of The Federalist, the 
Federal Farmer and Brutus essays play a leading role in this Article. But these works are not 
always representative, see SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND 
THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 25-26 (1999), and this Article draws 
on diverse Anti-Federalist sources. 
105.  The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to 
Their Constituents (Dec. 12, 1787), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra 
note 100, at 145, 165. 
106.  See, e.g., Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 9, 1788) (remarks of Patrick 
Henry) (“The Sheriff comes today as a State collector—next day he is federal—How are you 
to fix him? . . . When you fix him, where are you to punish him? For, I suppose, they will 
not stay in our Courts: They must go to the Federal Court; for, if I understand that paper 
right, all controversies arising under that Constitution; or, under the laws made in 
pursuance thereof, are to be tried in that Court.”), reprinted in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1050, 1065 (John P. Kaminski et al. 
eds., 1990); Brutus No. VI, N.Y. J., Dec. 27, 1787 (“They will have authority to farm the 
revenues and to vest the farmer general, with his subalterns, with plenary powers to collect 
them, in any way which to them may appear eligible. And the courts of law, which they will 
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This Anti-Federalist critique, of course, merely repeated arguments 
frequently made during the impost controversy. This time, though, Alexander 
Hamilton adopted a different response. Rather than reiterating the critical 
importance of having federal officers enforce federal law, Hamilton instead 
emphasized the role that state officers would play in collecting federal taxes. If 
feasible, Hamilton assured the readers of his Federalist essays, the federal 
government “will make use of the State officers and State regulations, for 
collecting the additional imposition. This will best answer the views of 
revenue, because it will save expence in the collection, and will best avoid any 
occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people.”107 Similarly, 
James Madison wrote that “the eventual collection [of taxes] under the 
immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and 
according to the rules, appointed by the several States.”108 
 
be authorized to institute, will have cognizance of every case arising under the revenue laws, 
the conduct of all the officers employed in collecting them; and the officers of these courts 
will execute their judgments.”), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 
100, at 393, 395; Essay of a Democratic Federalist, PA. HERALD, Oct. 17, 1787 (“[S]uppose the 
excise or revenue officers (as we find in Ward’s case)—that a constable, having a warrant to 
search for stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman, and 
searched under her shift,—suppose, I say, that they commit similar, or greater indignities, in 
such cases a trial by jury would be our safest resource, heavy damages would at once punish 
the offender, and deter others from committing the same: but what satisfaction can we 
expect from a lordly court of justice, always ready to protect the officers of 
government . . . ?”), reprinted in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 58, 
61; Luther Martin, Genuine Information VI, BALT. MD. GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1788 (“[A]ll the 
officers for collecting these taxes, stamp duties, imposts and excises, are to be appointed by 
the general government, under its direction, not accountable to the States; nor is there even 
a security that they shall be citizens of the respective States, in which they are to exercise 
their offices; at the same time the construction of every law imposing any and all these taxes 
and duties, and directing the collection of them, and every question arising thereon, and on 
the conduct of the officers appointed to execute these laws, and to collect these taxes and 
duties so various in their kinds, are taken away from the courts of justice of the different 
States, and confined to the courts of the general government . . . .” (emphases omitted)), 
reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
374, 377 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1984). 
107.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, supra note 1, at 227-28 (Alexander Hamilton); see also New York 
Ratification Convention Debates (June 21, 1788) (remarks of Alexander Hamilton) (“They 
will appoint the officers of revenue agreeably to the spirit of your particular establishments; 
or they will make use of your own.”), reprinted in 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1745, 1790 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2008). 
108.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 1, at 313 (James Madison); see also North Carolina 
Ratification Convention Debates (July 28, 1788) (remarks of Archibald Maclaine) (“The 
[federal] laws can, in general, be executed by the officers of the states. State courts and state 
officers will, for the most part, probably answer the purpose of Congress as well as any 
other. . . . State officers will as much as possible be employed, for one very considerable 
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In addition to worrying about abuses of power by tax collectors,  
Anti-Federalists also feared that a burgeoning federal bureaucracy would 
undermine support for state governments. Echoing earlier concerns about 
royal patronage, one prominent Anti-Federalist pamphleteer warned that 
federal collection of taxes would lead to a bureaucratic “system of influence.”109 
Hamilton responded, but again he significantly changed his tune, avoiding his 
prior rhetoric about creating a large corps of individuals loyal to the federal 
government. If the federal government wanted to expand its influence, 
Hamilton now explained in Federalist No. 36, it would try to “employ the State 
officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an 
accumulation of their emoluments.”110 In other words, an ambitious federal 
government would likely try to co-opt the loyalties of state collection agents by 
giving them generous compensation for performing federal duties. But, he 
asserted, this scheme would actually increase the influence of states, because 
the federal government would become reliant on state officers.111 Hamilton was 
 
reason—I mean, to lessen the expense.”), reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE 
GENERAL CONVENTION IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 140 (Jonathan Elliot ed., n.p., 2d ed. 
1836); Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 12, 1788) (remarks of James 
Madison) (“Is it not in the power of the General Government to employ the State officers? 
Is nothing to be left to future legislation, or must every thing be immutably fixed in the 
Constitution?”), reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 1184, 1203 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993). 
109.  Federal Farmer No. III (Oct. 10, 1787) (“Should the general government think it politic, as 
some administrations (if not all) probably will, to look for a support in a system of 
influence, the government will take every occasion to multiply laws, and officers to execute 
them . . . .”), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 234, 240; see 
also, e.g., Candidus No. II (Dec. 20, 1787) (“The Constitution proposed . . . may give an 
undue influence to Congress, by the appointment of a numerous Body of officers.”), 
reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 130, 135. As with the 
authorship of the Brutus essays, see supra note 103, scholars have debated Federal Farmer’s 
identity. Traditionally, scholars most often attributed the essays to Richard Henry Lee of 
Virginia. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 215. But the modern 
trend is to attribute the essays to leading New York Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith. See 
Michael P. Zuckert & Derek A. Webb, Introduction to THE ANTI-FEDERALIST WRITINGS OF 
THE MELANCTON SMITH CIRCLE, supra note 103, at xiv-xxi, xxvii-xxix (arguing that Smith’s 
authorship is more likely than Lee’s, though also positing that Smith may instead be the 
author of the Brutus essays). 
110.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, supra note 1, at 228 (Alexander Hamilton). 
111.  The Justices in Printz cited Federalist No. 36 but misinterpreted Hamilton’s point. Justice 
Scalia concluded that the passage “surely suggests inducing state officers to come aboard by 
paying them, rather than merely commandeering their official services.” Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 914 (1997). In dissent, Justice Souter commented that he understood 
the passage to indicate that Congress could demand state administrative support but had 
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going out of his way to highlight the active role that state officers would play in 
the new government. 
Debates about the judiciary repeated the same themes. For instance, George 
Mason, a leading Anti-Federalist in Virginia, warned his colleagues that the 
Constitution would “absorb and destroy the Judiciaries of the several states” by 
replacing them with federal courts.112 Responding directly to Mason’s 
objection, Oliver Elsworth observed that “all the cases, except the few in which 
[the federal Supreme Court] has original and not appellate jurisdiction, may in 
the first instance be had in the state courts and those trials be final except in 
cases of great magnitude.”113 Edmund Pendleton, Virginia’s highest judicial 
officer, reiterated that argument at the ratification convention in Richmond. 
“For the sake of œconomy,” he stated, Congress might appoint state courts as 
inferior federal courts. “There is no inconsistency, impropriety, or danger,” 
 
“an obligation to pay fair value for it.” Id. at 975-76 (Souter, J., dissenting). But  
Hamilton was merely explaining how a power-seeking federal government would seek 
influence—namely, by paying state officers. From this assumption, Hamilton argued that 
states should not fear a federal spoils system, because it would only increase state influence. 
Of course, forcing state officers to perform federal duties without compensation would have 
been a less effective way of winning their loyalties. 
112.  George Mason, Objections to the New Constitution, MASS. CENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1787, reprinted 
in 14 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 149, 150 
(John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1983); see also Martin, supra note 106, at 379 (“[T]o have 
inferior courts appointed under the authority of Congress in the different States, would 
eventually absorb and swallow up the State judiciaries . . . [and] unduly and dangerously 
encrease the weight and influence of Congress in the several States, be productive of a 
prodigious number of officers, and be attended with an enormous additional and 
unnecessary expence . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
113.  [Oliver Elsworth], A Landholder VI, CONN. COURANT, Dec. 10, 1787, reprinted in 3 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 487, 490 (Merrill 
Jensen et al. eds., 1978); see also Civis Rusticus, To Mr. Davis, VA. INDEP. CHRON., Jan. 30, 
1788 (“The judiciary of the United States have original jurisdiction only, in all cases affecting 
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be  
party—The convention has only crayoned the outlines, it is left to the Congress, to fill up 
and colour the canvas.” (emphasis omitted)), reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 331, 336 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988). But 
cf. Federal Farmer No. II (Oct. 9, 1787) (“It is however to be observed, that many of the 
essential powers given the national government are not exclusively given; and the general 
government may have prudence enough to forbear the exercise of those which may still be 
exercised by the respective states. But this cannot justify the impropriety of giving powers, 
the exercise of which prudent men will not attempt, and imprudent men will, or probably 
can, exercise only in a manner destructive of free government.”), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 230, 233. 
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Pendleton argued, “in giving the State Judges the Federal cognizance.”114 
Responding to some of these statements, modern proponents of the 
anticommandeering rule have rightly pointed out that Federalist promises 
regarding federal use of state officers do not necessarily presuppose that the 
federal government may commandeer those officers.115 Perhaps, as Michael 
Collins argues, the Founders shared an implicit understanding that federal use 
of state officers required state permission, or at least was subject to state 
refusal. According to Collins, Federalists were “reluctant to mention the 
coercion word in connection with their suggestions, lest Anti-Federalist 
sensibilities be offended” by assertions of federal power.116 Moreover, he posits, 
“the absence of any outcry” from Anti-Federalists in opposition to 
commandeering “is itself strong evidence that such a prospect was not part of 
the perceived message of The Federalist.”117 Collins acknowledges that some 
proponents of states’ rights had previously pushed for commandeering, but he 
argues that these steps were otherwise unwanted concessions offered as “a quid 
pro quo for the Constitution’s noninclusion of any reference to lower federal 
courts.”118 Once the Framers explicitly referred to inferior federal courts in 
Article III, Collins asserts, the proponents of states’ rights surely must have 
abandoned their support for commandeering.119 
Collins, however, misappraises the Anti-Federalists’ priorities. During the 
impost controversy, defenders of state autonomy had insisted that hiring 
 
114.  Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 20, 1788), reprinted in 10 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1412, 
1427 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993). 
115.  See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 910-11 (“[N]one of these statements necessarily implies—what is 
the critical point here—that Congress could impose these responsibilities without the 
consent of the States. They appear to rest on the natural assumption that the States would 
consent to allowing their officials to assist the Federal Government . . . .” (emphasis 
omitted)); Collins, supra note 8, at 140 (arguing that Prakash and others “move too quickly 
from the prospect that the federal government was empowered to seek assistance from, and 
to rely on, state officials to enforce and administer federal law, to the conclusion that state 
officials would be compelled to accept such employment”). 
116.  Collins, supra note 8, at 136. 
117.  Id. at 142. 
118.  Id. at 144. 
119.  Id. Collins’s principal argument is that it “would have been difficult for Anti-Federalists to 
argue in favor” of commandeering “given their usual rhetoric championing state and local 
prerogative against centralized power.” Id. at 136. Elsewhere, though, Collins dismisses the 
relevance of Roger Sherman’s support for commandeering as “the views of the losers.” Id. at 
143 n.298 (quoting Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A 
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 774 n.111 
(1984)). 
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federal collectors posed a greater threat to state sovereignty than 
commandeering state collectors. With the impost controversy coloring the 
entire debate, it was unnecessary for Federalists to explain that state officers 
would be compelled to enforce federal law. And surely contemporaries would 
not have thought that Federalist silence signaled a tacit denial of federal 
commandeering power. 
Less clear was the availability of enforcement mechanisms to compel state 
officials to perform their legal duties. The legacy of the impost controversy 
strongly suggested that state officials would be legally obliged to enforce 
federal law, but as Hamilton once explained, “If there be no penalty annexed to 
disobedience, the resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will in 
fact amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.”120 Federalists 
said little in the ratification debates about what penalties might attach if state 
officers disobeyed federal commands. In one respect, though, the Constitution 
itself facilitated state-officer compliance, and Federalists and Anti-Federalists 
alike often pointed to that provision when referring to the federal 
commandeering power. 
B. The Oath Clause 
By itself, evidence about implicit assumptions should not be dispositive  
of the Constitution’s original meaning. Direct acknowledgments of 
commandeering authority, however, arose during discussions about the Oath 
Clause. That provision declares that “Senators and Representatives before 
mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive 
and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall 
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution.”121 Today we 
think of this Clause as requiring federal and state officers to swear allegiance to 
the United States.122 For instance, current federal law requires officeholders to 
swear or affirm to “support and defend the Constitution of the United States 
against all enemies, foreign and domestic”—a phrasing that elides an 
implication of affirmative legal duties.123 Indeed, understanding the federal 
 
120.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra note 1, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton). 
121.  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
122.  See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 301 (2005) (describing 
the Oath Clause as “oblig[ing] a host of state and federal policymakers to take personal 
oaths of allegiance”). 
123.  5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006). Of course, Founding-era judges also famously argued that taking an 
oath required them to assess the constitutionality of laws. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart) 5, 6 (Super. Ct. L. & 
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oath as merely an oath of allegiance is so well ingrained that none of the 
existing literature identifies the Oath Clause as having any relevance to the 
Founders’ views about commandeering.124 Yet it was commonly thought at the 
Founding that an oath to “support” the Constitution implied that state officers 
would have to execute federal laws. Some Founders took the expansive view 
that a state officer’s duty to enforce federal laws stemmed from the oath itself 
and therefore operated even without congressional direction. Others viewed 
the Oath Clause as affirming the duty of state officers to execute federal laws 
when specifically directed by Congress. Either way, though, ratification-era 
commentaries about the Oath Clause are inconsistent with the idea that 
commandeering is “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system 
of dual sovereignty.”125 
In the late 1780s, most state constitutions required that state and local 
officers take two oaths: an oath of allegiance and an oath of office.126 An oath of 
allegiance generally required those officers to remain faithful to the state, 
whereas an oath of office was a promise to perform official duties. The Federal 
 
Eq. 1787) (“[T]he Judges observed, that the obligation of their oaths, and the duty of their 
office required them in that situation, to give their opinion . . . .”). 
124.  Cf. Prakash, supra note 12, at 1992-93 (“Although state judges are bound to the 
‘Constitution, and the Laws of the United States,’ state executives are only bound by oath to 
support the Constitution, and not federal law.”). 
125.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
126.  See, e.g., DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 22 (providing that all public officials swear or affirm to 
“bear true allegiance to the Delaware State, submit to its constitution and laws, and do no 
act wittingly whereby the freedom thereof may be prejudiced,” and that “all officers shall 
also take an oath of office”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, ch. VI, art. I (providing that all public 
officials take separate oaths to “bear true faith and allegiance to the said commonwealth” 
and to “faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent on me”); 
MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XXXV (“That no other test or qualification ought to be required, 
on admission to any office of trust or profit, than such oath of support and fidelity to this 
State, and such oath of office, as shall be directed by this Convention, or the Legislature of 
this State, and a declaration of a belief in the Christian religion.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. 
XII (“That every person, who shall be chosen a member of the Senate or House of 
Commons, or appointed to any office or place of trust, before taking his seat, or entering 
upon the execution of his office, shall take an oath to the State; and all officers shall also take 
an oath of office.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, § 40 (providing that all public officers take separate 
oaths to “be true and faithful to [the] commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and to “faithfully 
execute the office . . . according to law”); S.C. CONST. of 1778, ch. 2, art. XXXVI (providing 
that all public officers take an oath to “support, maintain, and defend the said State” and 
“serve the said State . . . with fidelity and honor, and according to the best of my skill and 
understanding”); see also VT. CONST. of 1786, art. XXVI (requiring all officeholders to take 
separate oaths of allegiance and office); cf. GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XIV (requiring all 
enfranchised persons, upon request, to take an oath “that I do owe true allegiance to this 
State, and will support the constitution thereof”). 
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Constitution, however, required only that all legislative, executive, and judicial 
officers “shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this 
Constitution.”127 When referring to federal officers, the Founders understood 
that the federal oath incorporated the guarantees of an oath of allegiance and an 
oath of office.128 The Oath Clause, however, applied to officers “both of the 
United States and of the several States.”129 Thus, as a textual matter, it is easy 
to see why some Founders thought that the Oath Clause implied that state and 
local officers would have affirmative federal duties. 
Indeed, some members of the Founding generation suggested that the 
Oath Clause implied a presumptive duty to enforce all federal laws, even 
without direction from Congress. “All the state officers,” Anti-Federalist James 
Winthrop stated, “are . . . bound by oath to support this constitution.” 
Combined with the Supremacy Clause, he asserted, this provision “cannot be 
understood otherwise than as binding the state judges and other officers, to 
execute the continental laws in their own proper departments within the 
state.”130 Prakash dismisses Winthrop’s argument out of hand, stating that 
 
127.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. This provision originated with the Virginia Plan, which provided 
that “the Legislative Executive & Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be 
bound by oath to support the articles of Union.” 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 95, at 22. My point is that many members of the Founding 
generation cited the Oath Clause when describing state-officer duties to enforce federal law. 
I am not arguing that the Framers of this provision intended (or did not intend) for the Oath 
Clause to imply such duties. For a useful summary of convention debates on this topic, see  
2 JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICA’S FOUNDING 539-40 (2005). 
128.  See New-York, April 9, N.Y. DAILY GAZETTE, Apr. 9, 1789 (noting that each congressman 
took the following “oath of office”: “I . . . a Member of the House of Representatives of the 
United States, do swear, (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the Constitution 
of the United States”), reprinted in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL 
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 3, 4 (Charlene Bangs Bickford 
et al. eds., 1992). One grand jury in western Virginia described the oath requirement in the 
same terms with respect to state officials. See PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, No. 
78, VI, folio 373 (presenting as a grievance the state legislature’s failure to pass a law 
“prescribing the oath of fidelity & office under the federal Government”). 
129.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
130.  [James Winthrop], Agrippa V, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 11, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, at 406, 407 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 1997). Winthrop made this observation in the context of a somewhat 
convoluted critique of the new federal judicial system and its potential displacement of state 
law. He did not, however, criticize the possibility that the federal government would require 
state executive officers to administer federal programs. Judge Samuel Spencer of North 
Carolina similarly observed that state officers “are to take an oath to carry into execution this 
general government.” North Carolina Ratification Convention Debates (July 29, 1788), 
reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
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“state executives and legislatures are only bound to the Constitution and not to 
federal law.”131 Many Founders, however, thought that the Oath Clause also 
applied to federal laws passed pursuant to valid constitutional authority.132 
Several weeks after Winthrop’s editorial, Hamilton articulated in Federalist 
No. 27 what seems to be a slightly different understanding of the Oath Clause. 
The Constitution, he wrote, would give the federal government power “to 
employ the ordinary magistracy of each [state] in the execution of its laws.”133 
Like Winthrop, Hamilton derived that power from the combined effect of the 
Supremacy Clause and the Oath Clause: 
[T]he laws of the confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate 
objects of its jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to 
the observance of which, all officers legislative, executive and judicial in 
each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath. Thus the 
Legislatures, Courts and Magistrates of the respective members will be 
incorporated into the operations of the national government, as far as its 
 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN PHILADELPHIA 
IN 1787, at 153 (Jonathan Elliot ed., n.p., 2d ed. 1836). This followed Archibald Maclaine’s 
response to the argument that “the oath to be taken by [state] officers will tend to the 
subversion of our state governments and of our liberty.” North Carolina Ratification 
Convention Debates (July 28, 1788) (remarks of Archibald Maclaine), supra note 108, at 140. 
Maclaine, who had just explained that state officers would generally be used to administer 
federal law, see supra note 108, asked rhetorically, “Can any government exist without 
fidelity in its officers? Ought not the officers of every government to give some security for 
the faithful discharge of their trust?” 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL 
CONVENTION IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, supra note 108, at 140. 
131.  Prakash, supra note 12, at 2001 n.231. 
132.  See, e.g., De Witt Clinton, A Countryman No. IV, N.Y. J., Jan. 10, 1788 (“I find too, that all 
our state officers are to take an oath or affirmation to support this new constitution—now as 
they are bound by an oath to support our state constitution too . . . one day he may be 
bound by oath to observe a law made by his own government, and the next day out comes a 
law or treaty from the general government, by which he is obliged by oath to do the 
contrary . . . .”), reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 597-98 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004). For other examples, see infra 
pp. 1135-1137, 1149-1151, 1159, 1166, 1169. Clinton’s comment raises the interesting  
issue—unexplored in this Article—of commandeering under the treaty power. Compare A. 
Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 877, 904 
(2000) (“[The] record suggests that the Framers assumed that the power to make treaties 
was . . . the power to impose at least limited duties on non-federal officials.”), with Edward 
T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 426 (2003) 
(“[T]he evidence regarding the role of state officials in founding-era consular treaties . . . is 
deeply ambiguous.”). 
133.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 1, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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just and constitutional authority extends; and will be rendered auxiliary to 
the enforcement of its laws.134 
According to Hamilton, the Oath Clause was not an independent source of 
authority for the government to legislate on particular topics. All national laws 
would still have to fit within “enumerated and legitimate” federal powers, such 
as taxation, coinage, and commerce. But within these areas, the Oath Clause 
implied (and would help effectuate) federal authority to commandeer state 
officers.135 
 
134.  Id. at 174-75. Hamilton included a footnote saying: “The sophistry which has been employed 
to show that this will tend to the destruction of the State Governments will, in its proper 
place, be fully detected.” Id. at 175 n.*. Hamilton’s reference is not entirely clear, but he may 
have been referring to Brutus’s remark that federal implied powers “would totally destroy all 
the powers of the individual states.” Brutus No. V, supra note 104, at 391; see also Brutus No. I 
(Oct. 18, 1787) (arguing that the Constitution would lead to “a complete consolidation of the 
several parts of the union into one complete government”), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 363, 368. Brutus had also criticized the Constitution’s 
grant of “force at the command of the government, to compel obedience,” which he thought 
“destroys every idea of a free government; for the same force that may be employed to 
compel obedience to good laws, might, and probably would be used to wrest from the 
people their constitutional liberties.” Brutus No. IV (Nov. 29, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 382, 384. A couple of days after Hamilton 
published Federalist No. 27, Brutus expanded upon his argument that the Federal 
Constitution would “totally destroy all the power of the state governments.” Brutus No. VI, 
supra note 106, at 394. Hamilton responded about a week later. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, 
supra note 1, at 196-98 (Alexander Hamilton). 
135.  The Printz majority said that understanding Federalist No. 27 as endorsing commandeering 
would make “state legislatures subject to federal direction.” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 912 (1997). Perhaps that is true, but it would hardly be inconsistent with Hamilton’s 
views. Just two weeks after writing Federalist No. 27, Hamilton plainly endorsed 
commandeering of state legislatures. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, supra note 1, at  
226 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he Fœderal Government may . . . have recourse to 
requisitions . .  .  .”). Earlier in the same essay Hamilton remarked, “The national 
Legislature can make use of the [tax-collection] system of each State within that State.” Id. 
While this passage might seem to refer to commandeering, Hamilton’s point was that the 
federal government need not develop its own system for assessing property values (for the 
purpose of levying direct taxes) because it could simply adopt state assessments as its own. 
What Hamilton meant to say in Federalist No. 27, the Printz majority asserted, is that 
state officers must “enact, enforce, and interpret state law in such fashion as not to obstruct 
the operation of federal law.” 521 U.S. at 913. The phrases “incorporated into the operations 
of the national government” and “rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws,” 
however, plainly indicate state participation in administering federal laws, not just non-
obstruction of the federal government’s own efforts. Moreover, Hamilton was showing that 
the Constitution “enable[s] the [federal] government to employ the ordinary magistracy of 
each [state] in the execution of its laws.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 1, at 174 
(Alexander Hamilton). The Printz majority, by contrast, described these passages as 
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Madison also mentioned the Oath Clause in the context of 
commandeering, though his views are decidedly less clear. In Federalist No. 44, 
he briefly explained each of the constitutional provisions “by which efficacy is 
given to all the rest.”136 The list of enabling provisions included the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the federal executive and judicial 
branches, and the Oath Clause.137 In his discussion of the Oath Clause, 
Madison explained why federal officers did not have a comparable duty to 
swear an oath to support state constitutions. State officials must take the 
federal oath, he argued, because they “will have an essential agency in giving 
effect to the Fœderal Constitution.”138 Federal officials, by contrast, would not 
be required to enforce state laws. As an example, Madison commented that 
federal elections “will probably, for ever be conducted by the officers and 
according to the laws of the States.”139 Like Hamilton, Madison was taking 
advantage of every available opportunity to emphasize the active role states 
would play in the federal system. His example of “essential agency,” however, 
was a constitutional duty of state officials rather than a duty imposed by 
Congress. Therefore, Federalist No. 44 does not reveal Madison’s views 
regarding statutory commandeering.140 
 
Hamilton’s effort to explain “why the new system of federal law directed to individual 
citizens, unlike the old one of federal law directed to the States, will ‘bid much fairer to 
avoid the necessity of using force’ against the States.” 521 U.S. at 913 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 1, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton)). In that excerpt, however, 
Hamilton was explaining why the Framers wanted to avoid a system in which the federal 
government could “only operate upon the States” through requisitions. THE FEDERALIST NO. 
27, supra note 1, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). Moreover, “force” in this 
passage refers to military power—not legal compulsion. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, supra 
note 1, at 95 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the possible use of federal “military force” 
against the states). 
136.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1, at 302 (James Madison). 
137.  Id. at 302-05 (Necessary and Proper Clause); id. at 305-06 (Supremacy Clause); id. at 307-08 
(executive and judicial branches); id. at 306-07 (Oath Clause). 
138.  Id. at 307. 
139.  Id.; see also Rufus King & Nathaniel Gorham, Response to Elbridge Gerry’s Objections (“[T]he 
Time place & manner of electing Representatives must in the first instance be prescribed by 
the state Legislatures . . . . [I]t is not a very probable supposition that a law of this Nature 
shd. be enacted by the Congress . . . .”), reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 550, 550-51 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1981). 
140.  Federalist No. 44 was not a tacit acknowledgment of commandeering’s unconstitutionality, 
as the Printz Court believed. See 521 U.S. at 915 (“It is most implausible that the person who 
labored for that example of state executive officers’ assisting the Federal Government 
believed, but neglected to mention, that they had a responsibility to execute federal laws.” 
(emphasis added)). Instead, Madison’s decision to emphasize the role of state officials in 
organizing and administering federal elections had a compelling political rationale. Namely, 
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As just shown, the Oath Clause occasionally came up during the ratification 
debates as a textual clue to how the new government would operate. The 
Clause’s role was relatively minor, though, because no one was openly 
questioning federal power to commandeer state executive and judicial officers. 
The argument enjoyed greater prominence during the First Congress,  
when such doubts began to appear. During ratification, however, the  
Anti-Federalists did question one form of federal power in a way that subtly 
revealed Founding-era attitudes and assumptions about commandeering. The 
issue surfaced during debates about the posse comitatus. 
C. The Posse Comitatus 
Though mostly silent about which officers would enforce federal law, the 
Constitution explicitly gave Congress the power to “provide for calling forth 
the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union.”141 Anti-Federalists generally 
preferred state administration of federal laws, and many worried that the 
power to call on state militias implied a corresponding lack of power to use 
civilian modes of law enforcement. Federal Farmer,142 for instance, excoriated 
the Framers for choosing military rather than civilian means for enforcing 
federal laws: 
I see no provision made for calling out the posse commitatus [sic] for 
executing the laws of the union, but provision is made for congress to 
call forth the militia for the execution of them—and the militia in 
general, or any select part of it, may be called out under military 
 
he was responding to the Anti-Federalists’ allegations that “[t]he controul given to 
Congress over the time, place, and manner of holding elections, will totally destroy the end 
of suffrage.” Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 5, 1788) (remarks of Patrick 
Henry), reprinted in 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 943, 964 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1990); see Virginia Ratification 
Convention Debates (June 14, 1788) (remarks of George Mason) (alleging that Congress 
may “take away the right of representation; or render it nugatory, despicable, or oppressive” 
by ordering that elections be held outside of the state, in which case citizens “should have to 
go so far that the privilege would be lost altogether”), reprinted in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1258, 1291 (John P. Kaminski et al. 
eds., 1993); see also Brutus No. IV, supra note 134, at 386 (discussing the potential for abuse 
of the federal power to regulate elections); Cato No. VII (same), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 123, 124-25; Letter from Elbridge Gerry to 
the General Court (Oct. 18, 1787) (objecting that the people “have no security for the right of 
election”), reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 94, 98 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1997). 
141.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
142.  For sources discussing Federal Farmer’s identity, see supra note 109. 
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officers, instead of the sheriff to enforce an execution of federal laws, in 
the first instance and thereby introduce an entire military execution of 
the laws.143 
In an era without public police forces, calling upon the posse comitatus was a 
universally accepted practice whereby a sheriff temporarily conscripted local 
citizens to assist him in enforcing the law.144 Disobedience to state and local 
authorities was quite common, and therefore sheriffs often called upon the 
posse.145 Federal Farmer did not explicitly endorse federal commandeering of 
citizens and their local sheriffs; rather, he criticized the Constitution for 
omitting such a power. Why should Congress be able to call upon militias when 
local posses would have been sufficient? Surely, Federal Farmer implied, this 
incongruity exposed invidious Federalist designs to usurp control over state 
militias. 
Hamilton replied in Federalist No. 29. Federal Farmer’s argument, he  
stated, exposed “a striking incoherence in the objections which have 
appeared . . . . The same persons who tell us in one breath that the powers of 
the federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the next 
that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the POSSE COMITATUS.”146 
Hamilton then put to rest any uncertainty regarding such a federal power: 
It would be . . . absurd to doubt that a right to pass all laws necessary 
and proper to execute its declared powers would include that of 
requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be 
entrusted with the execution of those laws . . . . What reason could 
 
143.  Federal Farmer No. III, supra note 109, at 242; see also Brutus No. IV, supra note 134, at  
386 (“This power [to use the militia to enforce the law] is a novel one, in free 
governments—these have depended for the execution of the laws on the Posse Comitatus, 
and never raised an idea, that the people would refuse to aid the civil magistrate in executing 
those laws they themselves had made.”). 
144.  See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *343 (noting that, in executing his duties, the 
sheriff “may command all the people of his county to attend him; which is called the posse 
comitatus, or power of the county”). See generally Gautham Rao, The Federal Posse Comitatus 
Doctrine: Slavery, Compulsion, and Statecraft in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America, 26 LAW  
& HIST. REV. 1, 9-19 (2008) (discussing the history of the posse comitatus). Congress granted 
this power to federal marshals in the 1792 militia bill. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional 
Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of 
Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 355-56 
(2002). 
145.  There is a well-developed literature on popular resistance to law enforcement in  
late-eighteenth-century America. See, e.g., PAUL A. GILJE, RIOTING IN AMERICA 35-59 (1996). 
146.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 1, at 182 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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there be to infer that force was intended to be the sole instrument of 
authority merely because there is a power to make use of it when 
necessary?147 
The context of Hamilton’s exchange with Federal Farmer suggests that 
Hamilton was implicitly supporting federal commandeering of state executive 
officers. Federal Farmer’s critique was that Congress could call on state militias 
but not on state civil law enforcement—namely, local sheriffs assisted by 
citizens of the county. In Federalist No. 29, Hamilton clarified that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause provides for implied federal power over civil law 
enforcement analogous to the enumerated federal power over state militias. In 
other words, Congress can require local posses to enforce federal laws just as it 
can require state militias to enforce federal laws. 
Two counterarguments are worth considering. First, perhaps Hamilton 
was asserting congressional power to commandeer citizens but not state  
law-enforcement officers. Indeed, he specifically mentioned “requiring the 
assistance of the citizens.” Hamilton, however, plainly considered it within 
Congress’s power to commandeer the posse comitatus, which was always led by 
public officials.148 If anything, his reference to “the officers who may be 
entrusted with the execution of those laws” only clarifies his argument in 
Federalist No. 27 that the Supremacy Clause and the Oath Clause would render 
state and local officers auxiliary to the enforcement of federal laws. 
One might also object that the officers entrusted with the execution of the 
laws could have been federal marshals instead of local sheriffs.149 Therefore, 
 
147.  Id. at 182-83. 
148.  See Rao, supra note 144, at 11 (“[S]heriffs, constables, selectmen, jailers, bailiffs, and 
coroners” could call the posse comitatus “as a vital tool for enforcing the state’s vaunted 
powers to protect the citizenry’s health, safety, and property.”); cf. Coyles v. Hurtin, 10 
Johns. 85, 87-89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813) (Kent, C.J.) (holding that a valid posse comitatus 
requires that the sheriff be in the county and personally engaged in the enforcement action, 
but he need not always be in the immediate presence of the posse); id. at 89 (Spencer, J., 
dissenting) (noting that a sheriff cannot “authorize an arrest, by parol, he being absent at 
the time”). 
149.  For two ratification-era examples of Anti-Federalists anticipating federal sheriff positions, 
see Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 5, 1788), supra note 140, at 962, where 
Patrick Henry remarked that “the people will find two sets of tax-gatherers—the State and 
the Federal Sheriffs”; and Federal Farmer No. XIII (Jan. 14, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 100, at 301-02, which notes that “[t]o discern the 
nature and extent of this power of appointments, we need only to consider the vast number 
of officers necessary to execute a national system in this extensive country . . . these 
necessary officers [include] judges, state’s attornies, clerks, sheriffs, [etc.] in the federal 
supreme and inferior courts . . . .” 
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perhaps Hamilton was not presuming federal power over state officials. While 
plausible, this argument runs contrary to the context of Hamilton’s debate 
with Federal Farmer. Their discussion centered on federal power over one 
state-based institution (the militia) and whether comparable power would 
exist over another state-based institution (the local posse).150 Thus, when 
Federal Farmer mentioned sheriffs enforcing federal law, his readers would 
most likely have understood him as referring to local sheriffs, who were the 
only sheriffs then in existence.151 The discussion in Federalist No. 29 is not 
dispositive, but it supports the view that Hamilton envisioned Congress 
invoking the Necessary and Proper Clause to commandeer state officers. 
Debates in the Virginia ratification convention paralleled the exchange 
between Federal Farmer and Publius. Several days into the convention,  
Anti-Federalist Green Clay voiced his concern that the power of Congress to 
call upon the militia to execute federal law needlessly risked “the establishment 
of a military Government.”152 Instead, the Framers should have provided “that 
the sheriff might raise the posse comitatus to execute the laws.”153 Clay then 
asked “why [militia enforcement] was preferred to the old established custom 
of executing the laws?”154 
Madison was the first to respond. Civil law enforcement would not always 
be sufficient, he stated, “as the sheriff must be necessarily restricted to the posse 
of his own county.”155 Cases of necessity, he argued, may therefore compel 
Congress to use state militias to enforce federal law. But Madison clarified that 
he “did not by any means admit, that the old mode was superceded by the 
introduction of the new one.”156 That is, existing state civilian institutions 
would remain the primary mode of law enforcement. Madison’s reference to 
county boundaries seems to clarify that the Virginia delegates were discussing 
the role of local sheriffs and their posses, not federal marshals. 
Patrick Henry—the leading Anti-Federalist at the Virginia ratifying 
convention—was unsatisfied. In his reply to Madison, Henry seemingly took 
 
150.  Although posses were local in character, the power to call upon the posse was a common law 
component of the police powers belonging to state governments. 
151.  See, e.g., Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 14, 1788), supra note 140, at 1274 
(remarks of James Madison) (noting that a sheriff was limited to operating within county 
borders). 
152.  Id. (remarks of Green Clay). 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. (remarks of James Madison). 
156.  Id. 
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for granted federal authority over state officials by virtue of the Oath Clause, 
but he rejected a comparable federal authority over “the civil power” of the 
people themselves. He began by criticizing the Constitution for not limiting 
federal uses of the militia to cases of necessity.157 Henry, however, further 
asserted that “[t]he civil power is not to be employed at all . . . . I read [the 
Constitution] attentively, and could see nothing to warrant a belief, that the 
civil power can be called for. I would be glad to see the power that authorises 
Congress to do so.”158 Instead, he warned, “[t]he sheriff will be aided by 
military force. The most wanton excesses may be committed under colour of 
this. For every man in office, in the States, is to take an oath to support it in all 
its operations.”159 With these statements, Henry casually acknowledged that 
the debate was really about federal power to commandeer individual citizens. 
Neither Madison nor Henry expressed any doubt that the federal government 
could compel state officers to enforce federal law. 
Echoing Madison’s earlier rebuttal, other Federalist delegates uniformly 
rejected Henry’s denial of federal power to call upon local posses. George 
Nicholas stated that “[t]he civil officer is to execute the laws on all occasions; 
and if he be resisted, this auxil[i]ary power is given to Congress, of calling 
forth the militia to execute them, when it shall be found absolutely 
necessary.”160 Governor Edmund Randolph agreed: 
Ought not common sense to be the rule of interpreting this 
Constitution? Is there an exclusion of the civil power? Does it provide 
that the laws are to be inforced by military coercion in all cases? No, 
 
157.  Id. at 1277 (remarks of Patrick Henry) (“[M]ilitary power ought not to interpose till the civil 
power refused.”). The Founders, of course, would readily have anticipated disobedience of 
this kind, especially in light of Shays’s Rebellion. See, e.g., Diary of William Maclay (Feb. 9, 
1791) (“[I]n my Opinion, [an excise law] could not be enforced by Collectors or Civil 
Officers of any kind [in western Pennsylvania] be they ever so numerous And that nothing 
Short of a permanent Military force could effect it.”), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 377,  
377-78 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
158.  Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 14, 1788), supra note 140, at 1277 (remarks of 
Patrick Henry). Two days later, Madison responded:  
There is a great deal of difference between calling forth the militia, when a 
combination is formed to prevent the execution of the laws, and the Sheriff 
or Constable carrying with him a body of militia to execute them in the first 
instance; which is a construction not warranted by the clause.  
  Id. at 1303. 
159.  Id. at 1277 (remarks of Patrick Henry). 
160.  Id. at 1281 (remarks of George Nicholas). 
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Sir. All that we are to infer, is, that when the civil power is not 
sufficient, the militia must be drawn out.161 
At the end of this onslaught, Green Clay responded that “he might be mistaken 
with respect to the exclusion of the civil power in executing the laws.”162 
Building on Hamilton’s argument in Federalist No. 29, the Virginia 
Federalists vehemently rejected any notion that Congress would lack authority 
to employ the usual mode of enforcing the law. Their views strongly suggest a 
federal power to commandeer local sheriffs. Yet perhaps the most significant 
feature of these debates is how they reflect the Anti-Federalists’ broader 
priorities. Federal Farmer, Green Clay, and Patrick Henry, among others, 
criticized the Constitution not because it provided for the commandeering of 
state militias but because it omitted a comparable power over more benign 
methods of state law enforcement.163 In other words, as with the debate over 
federal tax collection, disputes over federal power to call upon local posses 
reflected different federalism concerns than those most prevalent today. 
i i i .  early congressional practice 
Given Federalists’ repeated promises to enforce federal laws using state 
officers, one might have expected the new government to do just that. Yet 
these assurances went unfulfilled. Instead, Federalists quickly reverted to the 
position they had taken during the impost controversy, overwhelmingly 
 
161.  Id. at 1288; see also id. at 1293 (remarks of Henry Lee) (“But Gentlemen say, that we must 
apply to the militia to execute the constitutional laws, without the interposition of the civil 
power, and that a military officer is to be substituted to the Sheriff in all cases . . . . I am 
astonished that Gentlemen should attempt to impose so absurd a construction upon us.”). 
162.  Id. at 1294 (remarks of Green Clay). 
163.  Indeed, many Anti-Federalists supported federal power to call upon state militias. See, e.g., 
Madison, supra note 95, at 245 (reporting the New Jersey Plan’s proposal that “if any State, 
or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent [the] carrying into execution such 
acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth [the] power of the 
Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an 
obedience to such Acts, or an Observance of such Treaties”); James Madison, Notes on the 
Ratification Convention Debates (Aug. 18, 1787) (“Mr. Mason introduced the subject of 
regulating the militia. He thought such a power necessary to be given to the Genl. 
Government.”), in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 95, at 
324, 326; The Political Club of Danville, Kentucky, Debates over the Constitution (Feb.  
23-May 17, 1788) (“Mr Innes etc contended that the P[osse] Com[itatus] is to all intents a 
Military Force & such force necessary to enforce the Collection of Taxes.”), in 8 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 408, 414 (John P. 
Kaminski et al. eds., 1988). 
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supporting the creation of federal offices. To some extent this move was 
predictable. Hamilton, for instance, made his sentiments well known  
during the impost debates. But the Federalist agenda also benefitted from  
Anti-Federalist missteps—particularly their ham-fisted efforts to stave off dual 
office holding164—leaving Federalists able to achieve their policy objectives 
with little political cost. 
Still, Anti-Federalists did not roll over without a fight. Anti-Federalist 
congressmen urged their colleagues to use state officers rather than create a 
federal bureaucracy. And when Federalists responded with apprehension,  
Anti-Federalists insisted that state officers would be compelled by law and 
bound by their oaths to follow through on their federal responsibilities. That 
is, Anti-Federalists cited the same commandeering power that Hamilton had 
described in Federalist No. 27. 
A. Federalist Ambitions 
With the nation’s finances in shambles, the Washington Administration 
and its Federalist allies in Congress predictably put a federal impost atop their 
legislative agenda. Madison seems to have retained hope that the new 
government would use state officers to collect the tax.165 Most of his colleagues, 
 
164.  Dual office holding, as the name suggests, refers to the holding of two offices by the same 
individual. The practice was of particular concern to the Founding generation, as the King 
and his subordinates had obtained great influence over many officeholders by giving them a 
title or office that was prestigious or lucrative. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text. 
For later steps against dual office holding, see infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
165.  See H.R. Debate (May 9, 1789) (remarks of Rep. James Madison) (“A duty collected under 
the feeble operation of the state governments, cannot be supposed beyond our powers, 
when those duties have been collected by them, with feeble powers, but under a 
competition, not to say opposition of the neighbouring states.”), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 144, 145 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). Madison’s 
reference here is to effective federal power, not legal authority. Arthur Lee described 
Madison’s apparent change of opinion on the subject of state collectors: 
The first business of the House of Representatives was the impost[.] They were 
proceeding on a temporary Bill . . . . But Mr. Fitzsimmons arriving from 
Philadelphia turnd Madison directly about & with him the House, so that 
abandoning the temporary plan they proceeded upon discussing at leisure, a 
permanent system of enumerated Articles, penal Laws &c. &c. which will involve 
the appointment of all the officers . . . . 
  Letter from Arthur Lee to Francis Lightfoot Lee (May 9, 1789), in 15 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 
491, 491-92 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004). The next day, Madison reported: 
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however, disagreed. When the House of Representatives briefly considered a 
bill in May 1789 providing that “the regulations and the officers of [states with 
impost taxes] should be made use of for federal purposes,”166 the Federalist 
response was overwhelmingly hostile. John Laurance of New York argued that 
the proposal “was radically bad and defective.”167 State collections would be 
insufficient given that “the duties imposed in the different states 
[were] . . . upon [a] . . . much lower scale than the federal system,” and that 
“[t]he modes of collection in the different states were also very dissimilar.”168 
Such a system would thus lead to “great inequality in the general collection.”169 
Instead, Laurance “wished that the government would set out in the first 
instance with a general and original system of regulations, operating 
uniformly, and embracing all the states and all objects alike.”170 A chorus of 
representatives enthusiastically agreed.171 
Later debates over the Judiciary Act of 1789 demonstrated persistent 
Federalist opposition to entrusting state officials with federal duties. “[I]t 
would be [suicide] to trust the collection of the revenue of the United States to 
the state judicatures,” William Loughton Smith proclaimed, because “[t]he 
disinclination of the judges to carry the law into effect, their disapprobation of 
a certain duty, the rules of the court or other obvious causes might delay or 
 
The plan of temporary collection, by a general adoption of the existing 
regulations of the States is also before the H. of Reps. A Uniform plan will in a 
day or two follow it from the Committee appointed to report the proper mode. 
The House will be able to make their election, between the two.  
  Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (May 10, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 147, 147 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 
1979). 
166.  H.R. Debate (May 18, 1789) (emphasis added), reprinted in 10 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, supra note 
128, at 714, 714. The proposal was apparently spearheaded by Elbridge Gerry. See LEONARD 
D. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 391-92 (1948). 
167.  H.R. Debate (May 18, 1789), supra note 166, at 714. For the political leanings of the various 
members of Congress mentioned throughout this Article, see Office of the Clerk of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774 to Present, 
CONGRESS.GOV, http://bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). Organized 
political parties did not emerge until later in the 1790s, but the labels “Federalist” and  
“Anti-Federalist” remain useful as easily understood markers of an individual’s political 
leanings. 
168.  H.R. Debate (May 18, 1789), supra note 166, at 714 (remarks of Rep. John Laurance). 
169.  Id. 
170.  Id. at 715. 
171.  Id. Some congressmen also argued that the bill was unconstitutional because it did not 
create a uniform system of taxation. See, e.g., id. 
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frustrate the collection of the revenue, and embarrass the national 
government.”172 Theodore Sedgwick concurred, emphasizing that state agents 
would remain accountable primarily to state authorities: “Suppose a state 
government was inimical to the federal government, and its judges were 
attached to the same local policy, they might refuse or neglect to attend to the 
national business.”173 Without the power to remove disobedient state officers, 
Sedgwick claimed, the federal government should doubt state officers’ 
commitment to federal objectives.174 At no point, however, did Smith or 
Sedgwick say that state officials could, consistent with their legal duties, simply 
refuse to enforce federal law.175 
What had become of the Federalists’ ratification promises? Some scholars 
have treated these prior assurances as reflecting Federalists’ genuine desire to 
entrust federal responsibilities to state officers.176 This reliance on the 
Federalists’ public statements is misplaced. For Federalists such as Hamilton 
who had long been committed to creating federal offices, their ratification-era 
assurances seem to have been little more than a necessary political compromise. 
Indeed, it would have been tactically foolish for Hamilton and his political 
allies not to yield some ground regarding federal use of state officers after 
recent attempts to amend the Articles of Confederation had failed largely 
because of New York’s refusal to back down on precisely that issue. Once 
ratification had been secured, though, Federalists had little reason to actually 
use state officers. Madison, on the other hand, showed greater willingness after 
ratification to consider using state officers to enforce federal law,177 thus 
 
172.  H.R. Debate (Aug. 29, 1789) (remarks of Rep. William Loughton Smith), reprinted in 11 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 1348, 1350 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992). 
173.  Id. (remarks of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick). 
174.  Id. at 1369; see also William Paterson, Notes for the Debate on the Judiciary Act (June 23, 
1789) (“Shall we suffer Men so situated to mingle in our federal Adm[inistratio]n . . . . Do 
not give up the Power of collecting your own Revenue—you will collect Nothing—The State 
Officers will feel it their Interest to consult the Temper of the People of the State in which 
they live rather than that of the Union.”), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 475, 476 
(Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
175.  The Founders, of course, were all too familiar with this distinction between lawful authority 
and effective authority. 
176.  See, e.g., MAX M. EDLING, A REVOLUTION IN FAVOR OF GOVERNMENT: ORIGINS OF THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 117 (2003) (“In enforcing the law, 
the Federalists wished to avoid the construction of dual sets of administrations, one federal 
and one state, in favor of employing the same officers in dual capacities.”). 
177.  See H.R. Debate (May 9, 1789), supra note 165, at 145-46 (remarks of Rep. James Madison). 
 the yale law journal 122:1104   2013  
1148 
 
suggesting that his earlier protestations may have been more heartfelt, or at 
least that he continued to feel politically constrained. 
In addition to their policy arguments, Federalists in the House also cited a 
range of constitutional objections to using state judges. Egbert Benson of New 
York, for example, posited that “the words in the constitution are plain and 
full” with respect to establishing inferior courts and therefore “must be carried 
into operation.”178 Meanwhile, Fisher Ames and James Madison insisted that 
Article III mandated that the judges presiding over federal cases must have life 
tenure and protected salaries. Because most state judiciaries did not have these 
protections, Ames and Madison argued, inferior federal courts were 
constitutionally necessary.179 Then, in what seems to have been the first 
articulation of the anticommandeering doctrine, Ames remarked: 
In some of the States I know the judges are highly worthy of trust; they 
are safeguards to government, and ornaments of human nature. But 
whence would they get the power of trying the supposed action? The 
States under whom they act, and to whom alone they are amenable 
never had any such power to give, and this government never gave 
them any. We may command individuals: But what right have we to 
require the servants of the States to serve us[?]180 
Several days later Ames commented in a letter to a friend that “if the servants 
of the states are of course, or can be made by law, the servants of the U.S. it 
will produce a strange confusion of offices & ideas.”181 Federal power to compel 
state court jurisdiction over federal cases, he argued, would suggest analogous 
power to mandate state treasurers “to keep & pay out our money—or the 
 
178.  H.R. Debate (Aug. 29, 1789), supra note 172, at 1368 (remarks of Rep. Egbert Benson). 
179.  Id. at 1358 (remarks of Rep. Fisher Ames); see also H.R. Debate (Aug. 29, 1789) (remarks of 
Rep. James Madison) (observing that “he did not see how it could be made compatible with 
the constitution, or safe to the federal interests to make a transfer of the federal jurisdiction 
to the state courts,” especially because federal judges were required to have life tenure and 
protected salaries), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 367, 368 (Charles F. 
Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979); Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (July 28, 
1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 1155, 1156-57 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004); 
Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (July 11, 1789), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 1002, 1003 
(Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004). 
180.  H.R. Debate (Aug. 29, 1789), supra note 172, at 1358 (remarks of Rep. Fisher Ames). 
181.  Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (Sept. 3, 1789), in 17 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 1456, 1457 
(Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004). 
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sheriff to keep our rogues, & declare their bonds valid to secure their doing 
it.”182 Ames, in other words, was openly questioning federal commandeering 
power. But, he observed shortly afterward, “the house did not appear to 
understand my doctrine.”183 
Anti-Federalists rebuffed these constitutional arguments. Michael Stone of 
Maryland, for instance, argued that the Federalists’ own proposal granted 
concurrent state court jurisdiction, thus undercutting Ames’s and Madison’s 
argument that state courts were barred by Article III from hearing federal 
cases. Moreover, he asserted, the Constitution recognized that Congress “may 
delay from time to time, the institution of national courts,” thus indicating that 
lower federal courts are not required at all. Such delay in creating federal 
courts, Stone said, would be perfectly acceptable because “state judges are 
bound to take cognizance of the laws of the United States, and are sworn to 
support the general government.”184 Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire 
agreed that Congress may compel state judges to hear federal cases. “It has 
been said that this government cannot be carried into execution, unless we 
establish inferior courts,” he remarked, “because the state judges would not be 
bound to carry our laws into execution. I will just read a few words in the 
constitution in order to determine this point.”185 Livermore then read the Oath 
Clause, followed by the Supremacy Clause, and remarked that they provided “a 
clear answer to all the objections drawn from that source.”186 Elbridge Gerry 
did not disagree but pointed out that if a state prohibited its judges from 
hearing federal cases, a federal law that nonetheless imposed duties on state 
courts would have to be “necessary to carry into operation the constitution of 
the union.”187 In other words, Congress may commandeer state officers, but if 
 
182.  Id. at 1457. Ames continued: “If Judicial officers are not bound to execute our laws, as our 
servants, we cannot trust them—and if they are, why are ministerial officers less our 
servants? It seems to me that the Argumentum, ex absurdo, will be found to have some 
force.” Id. 
183.  Letter from Fisher Ames to John Lowell (Sept. 13, 1789), quoted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 507 n.3 (Maeva 
Marcus et al. eds., 1992).  
184.  H.R.   Debate (Aug. 29, 1789), supra note 172, at 1372 (remarks of Rep. Michael Stone). 
185.  H.R. Debate (Aug. 31, 1789) (remarks of Rep. Samuel Livermore), reprinted in 11 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 1375, 1389. 
186.  Id. at 1390 (remarks of Rep. Samuel Livermore). Interestingly, Livermore later denied the 
power of the federal government to enforce state laws. See 1 DAVID P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS 64 (1997). 
187.  H.R. Debate (Aug. 31, 1789), supra note 185, at 1390 (remarks of Rep. Elbridge Gerry) 
(commenting that Livermore “extended the sixth article of the constitution too far, for the 
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a state refuses to cooperate, Congress must satisfy the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in order to override state law. For Gerry, commandeering was not 
inherently improper.188 
During these debates, Anti-Federalists cited the Oath Clause in two 
interrelated ways. First, the Oath Clause helped them respond to the Federalist 
criticism that reliance on state courts would be plagued by the “disinclination 
of [state] judges to carry the law into effect.”189 The national government did 
not need direct supervisory control over state officers, Anti-Federalists argued, 
because these officers were bound by oath to fulfill their federal 
responsibilities. But this is not all they were arguing. Anti-Federalists were also 
responding to Fisher Ames’s doubts about federal power “to require the 
Servants of the States to serve us.”190 The Oath Clause helped answer that 
objection by showing that the Constitution had actually anticipated that state 
“servants” would serve the federal government. In other words, the Oath 
Clause both implied and helped effectuate federal commandeering power. 
Senate debates on the Judiciary Act also included a brief exchange about 
commandeering. Like his colleagues in the House, Anti-Federalist Richard 
Henry Lee of Virginia argued that the jurisdiction of federal courts should be 
limited to admiralty cases.191 Senator William Maclay, a Federalist from 
Pennsylvania, replied that this proposal was unconstitutional because Article 
III had “expressly extended” the jurisdiction of federal courts to all federal 
questions, thus precluding state court jurisdiction over federal issues.192 Lee 
responded that Maclay’s interpretation of the Constitution was untenable 
 
state judges would not be bound by any law altering the state constitution, unless such law 
was necessary to carry into operation the constitution of the union”). Gerry had stated 
earlier in the debate that “the laws and constitutions of some states expressly prohibit the 
state judges from administering, or taking cognizance of foreign matters.” Id. at 1386. 
188.  One could argue that Gerry was talking about implementing the Constitution itself rather 
than federal law, but that reading would be in deep tension with Gerry’s reference to the 
Supremacy Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause—both of which explicitly mention  
federal law—and with Gerry’s later endorsement of commandeering. See infra note 252 and 
accompanying text. 
189.  See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
190.  See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
191.  Diary of William Maclay (June 22, 1789), reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 85, 85 (Kenneth 
R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). Virginia also proposed a constitutional amendment 
prohibiting Congress from creating inferior courts other than admiralty courts. See Herman 
V. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States During the First 
Century of its History, in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE YEAR 1896, at 153 (Washington, D.C., Gov’t Printing Office 1897). 
192.  Diary of William Maclay (June 22, 1789), supra note 191, at 85. 
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because “the State Judges would be all Sworn to support the Constitution” and 
must “of course execute the Federal laws.”193 In other words, Lee was repeating 
the expansive interpretation of the Oath Clause that Anti-Federalist James 
Winthrop had articulated over a year earlier.194 
Once more, Maclay stood to speak. “[T]he Oath taken by the State 
Judges,” he opined, “would produce quite a contrary effect.”195 Because the 
Constitution vested federal jurisdiction solely in federal courts, he argued, “of 
Course the State Judges in Virtue of their Oaths, would abstain from every 
Judicial Act under the federal laws, and would refer all such Business to the 
federal Courts.”196 Although the contemporary records are somewhat unclear, 
Maclay (or perhaps one of his colleagues) may also have observed that Lee’s 
argument with respect to the Oath Clause “proves too much . . . . The Oath is 
in Nature of an Oath of Allegiance, and not an Oath of Office.”197 Therefore, 
Congress “[c]annot compel [state judges] to act—or to become our 
Officers.”198 No further debates are recorded on this issue, so it is unclear how 
 
193.  Diary of William Maclay (June 23, 1789) (punctuation edited for clarity), reprinted in 9 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 86, 87 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
194.  See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
195.  Diary of William Maclay (June 23, 1789), supra note 193, at 87. 
196.  Id. (punctuation edited for clarity). Maclay remarked that Lee’s argument was “very 
singular.” Id. The only unusual aspect of Lee’s argument, however, was his view that the 
Oath Clause itself imposed obligations on state officials. The idea that the oath implied 
federal power to commandeer state officials by statute was, if anything, conventional. 
197.  William Paterson’s Notes on Judiciary Bill Debate and William Paterson’s Notes for 
Remarks on Judiciary Bill (June 22, 1789), in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 183, at 410, 412. 
198.  Id. The entire excerpt from this section reads as follows: 
Cannot compel them to act—or to become our Officers— 
 
How as to Jayls—what Power over Sheriffs— 
Gov. of Laws. 
When a Crime is created, who shall have Jurisdn of it—you must enlarge the 
Jurisdn of a State Court. 
The Constn points out a Number of Articles, which the federal Courts must 
take up. 
The objects are not different—they legislate upon Persons and Things— 
Corporations shew the actual Existence of distinct Jurisdns 
The Constn has made the Judges of the several States the Judges of the 
Union; because they have taken an Oath to observe the Constn— 
This proves too much— 
 
Instance the State Legislatures. 
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other Senators viewed federal power to commandeer state judges. When 
Congress finally passed the Judiciary Act several months later, however, it 
 
The Oath is in Nature of an Oath of Allegiance, and not an Oath of Office—  
  Id.; see also Paterson, supra note 174, at 477 (same). Placing this excerpt atop his 158-page 
article, Collins attributes these words to William Paterson—one of the authors of the 
Supremacy Clause. See Collins, supra note 8, at 40 & n.1. Later, Collins states that “[g]iven 
Paterson’s relationship to the [Supremacy] [C]lause, his views provide especially 
compelling evidence of contemporary understandings on the issue of state court duties.” Id. 
at 153 n.325. It is doubtful, however, that Paterson ever uttered these words. As William 
Casto has observed, these notes “are either Paterson’s random ideas that he decided not to 
incorporate in the final draft of his speech or his notes of points made by other Senators 
during the initial debates.” William R. Casto, The First Congress’s Understanding of Its 
Authority over the Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101, 1127 (1985). Indeed, 
Paterson often took notes “without indicating who was speaking.” Kenneth R. Bowling & 
Helen E. Veit, Afterword to H.R. Debate (June 23, 1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, supra note 
128, at 483, 483 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
My own interpretation of these materials is consistent with Casto’s. Paterson took 
abbreviated notes of Senate debates on roughly legal-sized sheets of paper, with each page 
recording approximately forty to fifty lines. Casto, supra, at 1136-41. On the pages identified 
with the debates of June 22-23, lines 1 to 23 record debates preceding Paterson’s speech 
notes. Id. at 1128-29. Lines 24 to 45 are a very brief sketch of Paterson’s speech, which is 
outlined in more detail from lines 46 to 142. Compare id. at 1129 (line 25), with id. at 1130 
(lines 93-103), and id. at 1134-35 (lines 82-91). Lines 143 to 180 then bounce between topics. 
Based on a comparison of Paterson’s and Maclay’s notes, lines 151 to 167 of Paterson’s notes 
may be notes of a Maclay speech on June 23. Compare id. at 1132 (lines 165-67) (“The Constn. 
points out a Number of Articles, which the federal Courts must take up.”), with Diary of 
William Maclay (June 23, 1789), supra note 193, at 86 (“I rose and read over from the 
Constitution a number of the powers of Congress—Viz. collecting Taxes duties imposts, reg 
naturalization of Foreigners [etc.] . . . [and] declared that no force of Construction. could 
bring these Cases within Admiralty or maritime Jurisdiction—and Yet all these Cases, were 
most expressly the Province of the Federal Judiciary.”). Then, perhaps lines 168 to 175 are 
notes of Lee’s reply. Compare Casto, supra, at 1132 (“The Constn. has made the Judges of the 
several States the Judges of the Union; because they have taken an Oath to observe the 
Constn.”), with Diary of William Maclay (June 23, 1789), supra note 193, at 87 (“Mr. Lee after 
some time opposed me with a very singular argument, He rose and Urged that the State 
Judges would all be Sworn to support the Constitution. That they must obey their Oath, 
and of course execute the Federal laws . . . .”). Then, lines 176 to 180 may represent Maclay’s 
rejoinder. Compare Casto, supra, at 1132 (“Instance the state legislatures. The Oath is in 
Nature of an Oath of Allegiance, and not an Oath of Office—”), with Diary of William 
Maclay (June 23, 1789), supra note 193, at 87 (“I rose and opposed to this. that the very Effect 
of the Oath taken by the States Judges, would produce quite a contrary effect.”). Line 180 
was Paterson’s 56th line on the back of his second page. Perhaps he then continued 
recording the June 23 debates on a new sheet. This hypothesis fits harmoniously with 
Casto’s identification of a new sheet on which Paterson recorded the debate following the 
discussion of the Oath Clause. See Casto, supra, at 1137. Regardless of whether my 
suppositions are accurate, though, Paterson’s notes on the Oath Clause probably reflect one 
senator’s views on the subject. Whether Paterson shared these views is unknown. 
 commandeering and constitutional change 
1153 
 
rejected both Maclay’s and Lee’s proposals, instead giving federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over some federal claims but also giving state courts 
concurrent jurisdiction over others.199 
Modern defenders of anticommandeering doctrine acknowledge some 
support for commandeering among states’ rights proponents during the 
Articles of Confederation and at the 1787 Constitutional Convention. 
Nonetheless, they argue that this support was simply “a quid pro quo” in 
exchange for constitutional constraints against the development of a federal 
bureaucracy, and that Anti-Federalist support for commandeering evaporated 
after such constraints were rejected under the new Federal Constitution.200 
This argument has logical appeal, but it is resoundingly disproved by historical 
evidence. Anti-Federalists in the First Congress did not back away from their 
prior support for commandeering. Their continued reliance on 
commandeering suggests that they never viewed that power as simply a  
pre-ratification bargaining chip. Rather, commandeering remained an integral 
part of their argument for limiting the size of the federal government. 
Although perhaps counterintuitive, it is crucial to realize that federal 
commandeering power actually bolstered the Anti-Federalist agenda. Federalist 
leaders, “recalling the feebleness of the Confederation in its relations with the 
states, did not look with favor upon further reliance on state officers.”201 The 
Anti-Federalists knew this. They were not idiots or ideologues, and they 
understood that voluntary compliance was not a recipe for effective 
government. If federal duties placed on state officials were always subject to the 
whims of state politics, the Federalists in Congress would surely have avoided 
state-based law enforcement. But with Congress able to compel state-officer 
compliance, moderates like Madison might go along. In other words, 
commandeering remained essential to the political viability of the  
Anti-Federalists’ agenda. Having your hands tied, they wisely recognized, is 
not always a disadvantage. 
B. Virginia’s Disqualifying Act 
Though Anti-Federalists in Congress were pushing for state-based 
administration of federal law, other Anti-Federalists took steps that had the 
unintended effect of frustrating that agenda. About six months after Virginia 
 
199.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79. 
200.  See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 748 n.2 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 
Collins, supra note 8, at 144). 
201.  WHITE, supra note 166, at 390-91. 
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had ratified the Constitution, the state’s Anti-Federalist legislature passed a bill 
“to disable certain officers under the continental government, from holding 
offices under the authority of this commonwealth.”202 The statute (the 
“Disqualifying Act”) provided that any state officer receiving a commission or 
payment from the federal government would immediately forfeit his state 
office, though it also specified that “such disqualification shall not extend to 
militia officers, or the magistrates of county courts.”203 This Act assisted the 
Federalist agenda by creating a substantial barrier to the effective federal use of 
state officers. 
On its face, the Disqualifying Act was perfectly consistent with 
commandeering, and indeed both were aimed at lessening the potential for 
federal influence. Proponents of the bill worried that the federal government 
would use offices and salaries to co-opt the loyalties of state officers—an 
understandable concern given Hamilton’s comments to that very effect in The 
Federalist.204 During the ratification debates, for instance, Patrick Henry had 
warned of “rich, fat Federal emoluments” tied to “your rich, snug, fine, fat 
Federal offices.”205 Compared to “Federal allurements,” he lamented, state 
 
202.  Act of Dec. 8, 1788, reprinted in 12 STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE 
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, supra note 32, at 694-95. The bill stated, in relevant part:  
[W]hereas it is judged expedient and necessary, that all those who shall be 
employed in the administration of the said [federal] government, ought to be 
disqualified from holding, or administering any office, or place whatsoever, under 
the government of this commonwealth: Be it therefore enacted by the General 
Assembly, That the members of the congress of the United States, and all persons 
who shall hold any legislative, executive, or judicial office, or other lucrative office 
whatsoever, under the authority of the United States, shall be ineligible to, and 
incapable of holding any seat in either house of the general assembly, or any 
legislative, executive, or judicial office, or other lucrative office whatsoever, under, 
under [sic] the government of this commonwealth: Provided nevertheless, That 
such disqualifications shall not extend to militia officers, or the magistrates of 
county courts.  
  Id. The bill passed by a vote of seventy-one to fifty-two in Virginia’s House of Delegates. See 
Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, at 351, 351-52 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). 
203.  See Act of Dec. 8, 1788, supra note 202. 
204.  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, supra note 1, at 228 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting the 
possibility that the federal government might want “to employ the State officers as much as 
possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of their emoluments”); see 
also THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 1, at 493 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[A] power over a 
man’s support is a power over his will.”). 
205.  Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 12, 1788), supra note 108, at 1217 (remarks of 
Patrick Henry). Henry also worried that even “Justices of the Peace and militia 
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compensations were “poor” and “contemptible.”206 If state judges gained 
federal commissions, Henry warned, they would “combine against us with the 
General Government.”207 These same concerns had animated the Virginia 
legislature’s revocation of its impost authorization just six years earlier, when 
state legislators feared that congressmen were seeking “the appointment of a 
number of Officers dependent on them, & so to gain an undue Influence in the 
States.”208 Virginia’s Anti-Federalists, in other words, were acting on 
longstanding Whig fears of dual office holding, not out of any opposition to 
commandeering. In fact, Anti-Federalists’ support for commandeering and 
their simultaneous moves to prevent dual office holding were common efforts 
to stem the corrupting effect of federal patronage.209 
But however well intentioned the idea might have been, many Federalists 
smelled a sinister effort to undermine the nascent federal government. Edward 
Carrington, one of Madison’s friends serving in the Virginia assembly, 
described the Disqualifying Act as “the most striking evidence of Phrenzy, that 
madmen could have given, because it discovers the most wicked design to 
 
officers . . . are bound by oath in favour of the Constitution. A constable is the only man 
who is not obliged to swear paramount allegiance to this beloved Congress.” Id. 
206.  Id. 
207.  Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 20, 1788), supra note 114, at 1419. Henry 
seems to have been the bill’s most important advocate; Virginia Governor Edmund 
Randolph wrote to Madison that the legislature was considering “excluding all fœdral 
officers, except the military, from posts in the states: The patrons differ in the principles, 
and the scheme may possibly be abortive from this cause. But [Patrick] H[enr]y is decided 
in its favor; and all powerful.” Letter from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (Nov. 5, 
1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 7, at 335, 336 (Robert A. Rutland & 
Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). I examined the Patrick Henry Papers and Richard Henry Lee 
Papers at the Library of Congress and the Lee Papers at the University of Virginia but did 
not uncover any additional evidence regarding Anti-Federalist motives. I cannot tell whether 
Anti-Federalists understood the negative repercussions the bill would have in Congress. 
208.  Letter from Edmund Pendleton to James Madison (May 4, 1783), in 7 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, supra note 7, at 12, 12 (William T. Hutchinson & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1971). 
209.  For a discussion of the conventional Whig aversion to dual office holding, see WOOD, supra 
note 35, at 156-59, 452. For the close link between this fear and the appointment power, see 
id. at 146-47. For prior bans on dual office holding in state impost bills, see supra note 79. 
Several other states soon passed similar laws barring dual office holding. See U.S. 
CONSTITUTION SESQUICENTENNIAL COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 435-45 (1941); see also 19 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST 
FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 1069-82 (Charlene 
Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2012) (collecting correspondence that discusses a dual-office-
holding dispute in New York). Interestingly, the North Carolina House of Commons also 
rejected by a vote of fifty-five to twenty-six a proposal to administer federal oaths to state 
legislators and the governor, as mandated under the Federal Constitution. See 21 THE STATE 
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 1021 (Goldsboro, N.C., Nash Bros., Walter Clark ed., 1903). 
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embarrass the New Govt.”210 According to Edmund Pendleton, the Act was 
intended “to realize those high drawn pictures of War between the fœdral  
& State Judges, & the Officers of both emploied in levying Executions  
& Collecting taxes.”211 Similarly, Alexander Hamilton claimed that the 
Constitution’s “efficacy was to be destroyed by throwing obstacles in the way 
of the administration of the system.”212 
Notwithstanding their vocal objections, however, Federalists saw an 
opportunity to achieve their political goals while blaming the Anti-Federalists 
for a larger-than-promised federal bureaucracy. “The conduct of the last 
[Virginia] Assembly may very easily be used in favor of the new government 
and made to prove that their conduct proceeded from a wish not to amend but 
 
210.  Letter from Edward Carrington to Henry Knox (Dec. 30, 1788), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1788-1790, at 384, 385 (Gordon DenBoer ed., 
1984). 
211.  Letter from Edmond Pendleton to James Madison (May 3, 1789), in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON, at 534, 534 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 1991); see also A True Federalist, DAILY 
ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Jan. 7, 1789 (“[The Act was] dictated rather by the acrimony of revenge 
than a zeal for the public good. It looked like the last effort of a disappointed party, which 
attempted to clog the operations of a government, the establishment of which it could not 
prevent.”), reprinted in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 
1788-1790, supra note 210, at 387, 390. “A True Federalist” was Richard Bland Lee, “perhaps 
in collaboration with [George Lee] Turberville and [Edward] Carrington.” Robert A. 
Rutland & Charles F. Hobson, Afterword to Letter from Richard Bland Lee to James 
Madison (Dec. 12, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 391, 392 n.1 (Robert A. 
Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). Similarly, “an Extract of a late letter, from  
a Member of our House of Delegates”—quoted by George Mason in a letter to a  
friend—stated that “the Feds have swallowed [the Disqualifying Act and other  
Anti-Federalist bills] like Wormwood.” Letter from George Mason to John Francis Mercer 
(Nov. 26, 1788), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON: 1725-1792, at 1132, 1133-34 (Robert A. 
Rutland ed., 1970). Wormwood is often referenced biblically for its bitterness. See, e.g., 
Proverbs 5:4 (King James) (“But her end is bitter as wormwood . . . .”); Lamentations 3:15 
(King James) (“He hath filled me with bitterness, he hath made me drunken with 
wormwood.”). Speaking generally of legislative affairs at this time, James Madison 
remarked: 
My information from Richmond is very unpropitious to federal policy. . . . A 
decided and malignant majority may do many things of a disagreeable nature; but 
I trust the Constitution is too firmly established to be now materially 
vulnerable. . . . Indeed Virginia is the only instance among the ratifying States in 
which the Politics of the Legislature are at variance with the sense of the people 
expressed by their representatives in Convention.  
  Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Nov. 5, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 334, 334 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). 
212.  [Alexander Hamilton], H. G. Letter No. XII (Mar. 8, 1789), reprinted in 5 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 293, 293 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). 
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to destroy the new government,” wrote George Nicholas in a letter to 
Madison.213 Lambasting the Disqualifying Act in a New York newspaper, 
Hamilton exclaimed that it “would oblige the United States to have a complete 
set of officers for every branch of the national business, judges, justices of the 
peace, sheriffs, jail-keepers, constables, [etc.].”214 Of course, that had been 
Hamilton’s design all along, but the Disqualifying Act provided an opportunity 
to achieve that result at no political cost—and even at the expense of his 
political opponents. Another Federalist echoed this reasoning in a widely 
distributed pamphlet: “If the federal government shall therefore be under the 
necessity of multiplying officers . . . your good sense will teach you where to 
place the odium of such measures.”215 
Indeed, several Federalists in the Virginia legislature apparently had voted 
for the disqualification bill precisely because of its potential advantages for the 
Federalist agenda. In a fascinating letter to Madison, Edward Carrington 
acknowledged that the Act would likely hinder the administration at the outset, 
but he was more sanguine about its long-term prospects: 
The disquallifying Act[’s] . . . design is doubtless to create discontents 
against the Federal Govt. from the numbers of additional Officers 
which must be employed amongst the People, indeed to embarrass the 
U. S.; it will, in the first instance, have this effect, but the scheme must 
at length, should the first difficulties be got over, have a direct contrary 
tendency—it will ultimately, in my opinion, greatly abridge the 
importance of the State, for the U. S, being debarred from confering 
their powers upon State Officers, will induce the most able of these into 
their service, particularly in the judiciary . . . .216 
Several Federalists in the Virginia legislature, he added, “have rather connived 
at this project, conceiving the consequences which I have mentioned as 
desirable.”217 
 
213.  Letter from George Nicholas to James Madison (Jan. 2, 1789), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 406, 407 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). 
214.  Hamilton, supra note 212, at 294. 
215.  A True Federalist, supra note 211, at 390. 
216.  Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 9, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 336, 337 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). 
217.  Id. Carrington continued: “I however differ from them in opinion—at least I think it will be 
necessary to be able to shew the people, when the odious circumstances appear, to whome 
they are to attribute them.” Id. Governor Randolph—a crucial convert to the Federalist cause 
who had previously refused to sign the Constitution as a convention delegate in 
Philadelphia—apparently voted against the bill on the basis of unknown objections to “one 
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Disentangling Federalists’ motives from their politically driven rhetoric is 
tricky, but judging from private correspondence, the Disqualifying Act seems 
to have influenced legislation in the First Congress. In April 1789, for example, 
Madison reported to Edmond Pendleton that the Virginia Act threatened to 
delay the impost bill because potential disqualifications “may require some 
special provision of a Judiciary nature for cases of seizure &c; until the 
Judiciary department can be systematically arranged; and may even then oblige 
the fed[eral] Legislature to extend its provisions farther than might otherwise 
be necessary.”218 The following month, Massachusetts Congressman Caleb 
Strong observed privately that the Disqualifying Act had “prohibited 
[Virginia’s] Officers from holding Offices under the United States, and 
[Virginia’s] Courts from having Jurisdiction of Causes arising under the Laws 
of the Union.”219 Worried about the efficacy of federal law, he expressed 
concern that “by such Laws every State would be able to defeat the Provisions 
of Congress if the Judiciary powers of the Genl. Government were directed to 
be exercised by the State Courts.”220 Strong was mistaken about the scope of 
the Disqualifying Act, which did not prohibit conferral of jurisdiction—even 
mandatory jurisdiction—on state courts. Instead, the Act prohibited state 
officers from holding federal offices or receiving federal salaries, and it even 
specified that “magistrates of county courts” were exempted entirely.221 But 
 
or two inferior clauses.” Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), 
supra note 202, at 351, 352 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977). 
218.  Letter from James Madison to Edmond Pendleton (Apr. 19, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 89, 89 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
219.  Letter from Caleb Strong to Robert Treat Paine (May 24, 1789), in 15 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 
623, 623 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 2004). 
220.  Id.; see also Pierce Butler, Notes on the Debate of the Judiciary Act (June 22, 1789) (quoting 
Senator Caleb Strong describing Virginia’s Disqualifying Act as “[o]ne State saying that 
their officers shall not take Cognisance of the Cause of the Federal Governmt”), reprinted in 
9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 454, 454 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds. 1992). Madison may 
have been confused about the statute’s scope, or he may have simply been imprecise with his 
description. See Letter from James Madison to Edmond Pendleton (Apr. 19, 1789), supra 
note 218, at 89 (describing the bill as “disqualifying State officers, Judiciary as well as others, 
from executing federal functions”). 
221.  For the text of the Act, see supra note 202. As the General Court of Virginia explained several 
decades later, “[I]f any Judge of this State were to accept of either commission, or 
compensation, from the General Government, he would by that act vacate his office.” 
Jackson v. Rose, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 34, 40 (1815); see also Letter from Edward Carrington to 
James Madison (Aug. 3, 1789) (“State Courts, where they are well established might be 
adopted as the inferior Federal Courts, except as to Maritime business. . . . I do not 
apprehend that the extraordinary Act of Virga. will interfere with the operation of a plan 
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perceptions were what mattered, especially with the Federalists predisposed to 
create a self-sufficient federal bureaucracy. 
For some who realized that the federal government could still have placed 
duties on state officers, commandeering remained a viable option. Edward 
Carrington, for instance, thought that the federal government could easily 
avoid the most pernicious consequences of the Act because of “the clause which 
binds all state Officers to observe the laws of the Gen[eral] Govt. & to execute 
them.”222 Carrington was of course referring to Article VI, which contains the 
Supremacy Clause and Oath Clause. Most Federalists apparently did not share 
Carrington’s optimistic attitude about the efficacy of relying on oaths without 
any accompanying federal incentives.223 Hamilton, for example, was well aware 
of “how essential it must be to the execution of the law” to pay officeholders 
“competent, though moderate rewards.”224 But Carrington’s comments show 
that, while many Federalists were quick to use the Disqualifying Act to achieve 
the political position they already wanted, the Act may have influenced the 
Federalist agenda. By heightening Federalists’ fears that dependence on state 
agents would leave enforcement of federal law vulnerable to state interference, 
the Act likely reduced any disunity that might have otherwise arisen between 
the more nationalist Federalists and their moderate allies, such as Madison and 
Carrington, who initially seemed inclined to follow through on their 
ratification promises. At a minimum, the Act placed the Anti-Federalists at a 
strategic disadvantage politically, with little argument other than the Oath 
 
thus founded. If the duties vest as I suggest, no act of the State, which does not annihillate 
its judiciary establishment, can affect them; the Act alluded to however only prohibits the 
acceptance of individual appointments, which are not necessary for the adoption of the State 
Courts into the federal system.”), reprinted in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 322, 323 
(Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). In 1789, for example, Cyrus Griffin 
lost his state office after receiving a federal commission to negotiate with the Southern 
Indians. See Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (Nov. 2, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 441, 441-42 n.3 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). For an 
additional instance where the Disqualifying Act may have had an effect, see Letter from 
Edward Carrington to James Madison (Mar. 2, 1790), in 13 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
77, 79 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland eds., 1981), where Carrington noted that 
“our Comrs. of the Taxes could have done this business [of taking the federal census] better 
than any others from their acquaintance with the families in the course of their other  
duty—a Law of this State however prohibits their being set about it.” 
222.  Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Nov. 18, 1788), supra note 202, at 352; see 
also Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison (Aug. 3, 1789), supra note 221. 
223.  This is not to say that oaths were unimportant in the eighteenth century. See Mashaw, supra 
note 98, at 1309-10. 
224.  Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Difficulties in the Execution of the Act Laying Duties on 
Distilled Spirits, in 11 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 77, 105-06 (Harold C. Syrett 
ed., 1966).  
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Clause for why the federal government should trust state officers to execute 
federal law. 
The Disqualifying Act also helps explain why Congress crafted legislation 
that—when viewed in isolation—might otherwise suggest a lack of 
commandeering power. Just after passing the Judiciary Act of 1789, for 
example, Congress “recommended to the legislatures of the several States to 
pass laws, making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their gaols, to receive 
and safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the authority of the 
United States.”225 In states that complied, the federal government would give 
jailers fifty cents per prisoner. The Printz majority speculated that the 
resolution might provide “some indication” of an original understanding 
against commandeering.226 The relevant congressional debates, however, do 
not reveal any hostility to commandeering.227 Instead, the Virginia 
 
225.  Resolution of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 96, 96. When Georgia refused, Congress passed 
a law requiring the federal marshal to rent jail space to house federal prisoners within that 
state. See Resolution of Mar. 3, 1791, 1 Stat. 225. Most states, however, seem to have accepted 
Congress’s proposal. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 5, 1789, ch. 521, 1789 Pa. Laws 405-06 (providing 
for the custody of prisoners committed under the authority of the United States) (Dec. 5, 
1789); Act of Nov. 12, ch. 41, 1789 Va. Acts 43 (providing for the safekeeping of prisoners 
committed under the authority of the United States into any of the jails of the 
commonwealth); Act of Oct. 24, 1789 (requiring all public jailers to receive and keep 
prisoners committed under U.S. authority), reprinted in LAWS OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
446-47 (Wilmington, R. Porter & Son 1829). 
226.  521 U.S. 898, 909 (1997). 
227.  For the limited drafting history of the resolution, see Resolution on Safekeeping of Prisoners, 
reprinted in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 2113 (Charlene Bangs Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 
1986). A few Congressmen made comments about jails during debates over the 1789 
Judiciary Act, but these are inconclusive. See, e.g., H.R. Debate (Aug. 31, 1789), supra note 
185, at 1384 (remarks of Rep. Michael Stone) (reciting logistical difficulties of state 
administration of federal prisoners and questioning whether “it [is] a proper return by the 
marshal [if] the prisoner is kept by the state sheriff”); id. at 1387 (remarks of Rep. Elbridge 
Gerry) (noting that logistical difficulties could be overcome by passing laws pursuant to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause); H.R. Debate (Aug. 29, 1789), supra note 172, at 1352 (remarks 
of Rep. William Loughton Smith) (“I am not persuaded that there will be a necessity for 
having separate court-houses and gaols: Those already provided in the several states will be 
made use of by the district court.”); H.R. Debate (Aug. 24, 1789) (remarks of Rep. Samuel 
Livermore) (“I hope the [federal] government will not adopt this last mode [regarding use 
of state jails], or escapes may be made in great number. I apprehend we shall find the 
execution offer no inconsiderable obstacle to our system.”), reprinted in 11 DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 
1324, 1332 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 1992). Livermore’s comment about a 
heightened number of escapes may refer to the frequent problem of inmates  
bribing jailkeepers. See Douglas Greenberg, The Effectiveness of Law Enforcement in 
Eighteenth-Century New York, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 173, 179 (1975). As explained earlier, 
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Disqualifying Act provides a more persuasive explanation of the congressional 
decision to request rather than compel state cooperation. The Disqualifying Act 
prohibited the federal government from paying jailers directly, and Federalists 
were understandably reluctant to force jailers to assume these expenses 
themselves—a guaranteed way to evoke hostility toward the federal 
government. Thus, the jail resolutions tell us little, if anything, about the 
Founders’ understandings of federal powers. 
Yet again, the Disqualifying Act raises important questions about 
enforcement mechanisms. How far could Congress go to ensure state-officer 
compliance with federal demands? Some Federalists thought that the 
Disqualifying Act was unconstitutional because it might inhibit the 
enforcement of federal law.228 But no opportunity arose to test the boundaries 
of state power because Federalists, eager to create federal offices, had no 
interest in forcing state officers to accept federal payments or titles. 
C. Federal Use of State Officers 
A persistent challenge for originalists is figuring out how to weigh 
conflicting Founding-era evidence. In the case of commandeering, for example, 
should originalists credit Fisher Ames’s and William Maclay’s view that the 
federal government cannot commandeer state officers, or should they instead 
credit the many individuals who seem to have supported that power? 
Obviously, we have no way of knowing for certain what a majority of the 
public thought (or would have thought had the topic crossed their minds) 
about the meaning of any constitutional provision. Early congressional 
 
Livermore and Stone had endorsed the Anti-Federalist plan to commandeer state judges. 
Their arguments here with respect to jails related to the difficulties that would arise if the 
federal government created its own courts. 
228.  In his earliest comments about the Disqualifying Act, Carrington seems to have thought 
that it was unconstitutional because it attempted to ban any state-level execution of federal 
law. In one early letter, for example, Carrington wrote that the law “can have no effect in 
fact, for the New Constitution binds every State officer to observe & Execute the Federal 
Laws.” Letter from Edward Carrington to Henry Knox (Dec. 30, 1788), supra note 210, at 
385. He continued by observing that “the State courts must decide all causes of a Federal 
Nature according to the Laws which the Federal Govt shall pass concerning them.” Id. 
Moreover, he stated, even if it could be “in the power of a State to prevent their officers from 
Executing the Federal Laws, & a Multiplication of Officers amongst the people should be the 
consequence, I apprehend the odium of such a circumstance would naturally turn upon the 
authors of the necessity.” Id. But the following year, Carrington clearly understood that the 
Act prevented only the acceptance of federal commissions and payments. See supra note 221. 
Hamilton also seems to have doubted the Disqualifying Act’s constitutionality. See supra 
note 214 and accompanying text. 
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decisions, however, provide strong evidence that most congressmen accepted 
federal power to commandeer state officers. 
Several early statutes imposed administrative burdens on state courts. For 
example, Congress required that the common law courts in every state “shall 
record” citizenship applications,229 and that it “shall be the duty” of the clerk to 
transmit abstracts of those applications to the Secretary of State230 and 
maintain a registry of foreign citizens.231 Another federal law “authorized and 
required” state justices of the peace—who traditionally had both judicial and 
executive responsibilities—to direct “three persons in the neighbourhood, the 
most skilful in maritime affairs that can be procured” to examine vessels that 
were allegedly leaking or otherwise unsafe for travel.232 And a 1799 statute 
mandated that state courts “shall take cognizance” over cases arising under the 
federal postal bill.233 Importantly, none of these statutes conflicted with the 
Virginia Disqualifying Act (or similar acts passed later in other states) by 
granting federal commissions or emoluments.234 
The Printz majority dismissed these statutes as irrelevant because they were 
directed at judicial rather than executive officers.235 Congressional power to 
 
229.  Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103, 103 (establishing a uniform rule of 
naturalization). Some states had separate courts that heard equity cases, and therefore it was 
necessary to specify common law courts. 
230.  Act of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. 566, 566-67 (repealing and replacing the prior 
legislation establishing a uniform rule of naturalization). This bill was the first installment 
of the infamous Alien and Sedition Acts, though the commandeering aspect of the bill was 
routine. 
231.  Act of Apr. 14, 1802, ch. 28, § 2, 2 Stat. 153, 154-55 (repealing and replacing prior  
legislation establishing a uniform rule of naturalization). 
232.  Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 3, 1 Stat. 131, 132 (providing for the regulation of seamen  
in the merchant service). 
233.  Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 28, 1 Stat. 733, 741 (establishing certain rules regarding the  
Post Office of the United States); cf. Michael G. Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting 
Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA. L. REV. 243, 270 (2011) (“The Theft of the Mails Act of 
1799 . . . is obviously some evidence that Congress supposed state courts could handle 
genuinely criminal prosecutions for genuinely federal crimes. But the statute appears to be 
singular, and examples of attempted state-court enforcement are difficult to find.”). 
234.  Under these statutes, payments to state officials were made in the form of negotiated fees 
paid by applicants directly to the officials. For more information on fee-based payments in 
the Founding era, see NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780-1940 (forthcoming 2013). The Virginia 
General Court later refused to enforce the Theft of Mails Act, but not because of the 
Disqualifying Act. See Commonwealth v. Feely, 1 Va. Cas. 321, 323 (1813) (“[A]s the offense 
described in the indictment in this case, is created by an act of congress, the said superior 
court, being a state court, hath not jurisdiction thereof . . . .”). 
235.  521 U.S. 898, 905-07 (1997). 
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commandeer state judges, the majority argued, is “explicit” in the text of the 
Supremacy Clause, which provides that the Constitution, federal laws, and 
treaties, “shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State 
shall be bound thereby.”236 This expansive reading of the Supremacy Clause has 
no merit. The directive to the “judges in every State” at the end of the 
Supremacy Clause “neither confers nor obliges state court jurisdiction; it 
simply requires that if and when state courts take jurisdiction over a case, they 
follow the supreme law of the land.”237 The purpose of the additional language, 
which today may seem superfluous, was to establish that state judges must 
review whether state law conflicts with the Federal Constitution, federal laws, 
or treaties.238 Judicial review—as that practice is now known—was extremely 
 
236.  Id. at 907 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2); see also New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992) (noting that federal statutes are enforceable in state 
courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause). 
237.  Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal 
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 256 n.165 (1985); see also Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 
752 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause’s exclusive function is to 
disable state laws that are substantively inconsistent with federal law—not to require state 
courts to hear federal claims over which the courts lack jurisdiction.”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 
968 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Judges Clause “commands state judges to 
‘apply federal law’ in cases that they entertain, but it is not the source of their duty to accept 
jurisdiction of federal claims that they would prefer to ignore”); Bradford R. Clark, The 
Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 103 (2003) 
(“The Supremacy Clause . . . establishes a rule of decision to be applied by courts . . . after 
jurisdiction attaches.”); Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal Power To 
Commandeer State Courts: Implications for the Theory of Judicial Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 
72 (1998) (“Both by its individual terms and its broader textual context, the State Judges 
Clause concerns solely the implementation of an independently authorized congressional 
power to commandeer. It does not itself provide a constitutional source of congressional 
power to engage in such commandeering.”). As Redish and Sklaver also correctly point out, 
the Printz majority’s alternative rationale for distinguishing the constitutionality of 
commandeering state judges—namely, that the Constitution withheld the creation of lower 
federal courts—would apply equally to commandeering state executive officers, because the 
Constitution similarly withheld the creation of federal executive offices such as tax collector 
positions. See Redish & Sklaver, supra, at 80. 
238.  See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 175 (1996) (“[T]he supremacy clause marked an attempt to incorporate a 
principle of judicial review into all the state governments by the unilateral fiat of the 
Constitution.”); see also 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1833 (1833) (The Judges Clause “was but an expression of the necessary 
meaning of the former clause, introduced from abundant caution, to make its obligation 
more strongly felt by the state judges. The very circumstance, that any objection was made, 
demonstrated the utility, nay the necessity of the clause, since it removed every pretence, 
under which ingenuity could, by its miserable subterfuges, escape from the controlling 
power of the constitution.”). 
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controversial in 1787, and most state judges who had exercised this novel 
power had been swiftly repudiated, sometimes through impeachment. As Larry 
Kramer observes, the explicit language about the duty of state judges 
“answered the leading objection to judicial review, which was that judges had 
not been authorized by the people to make such decisions.”239 In short, the 
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to exercise judicial review vis-à-vis 
federal law; it does not create or even suggest federal power to commandeer 
state courts. 
Moreover, even if commandeering of judicial officers were somehow 
constitutionally distinguishable from commandeering of executive officers, 
these early statutes remain significant because they undermine the best 
historical evidence against commandeering. During the Judiciary Act debates in 
1789, Fisher Ames and William Maclay had directly questioned federal power 
to commandeer state officers.240 These statements, of course, were far 
outnumbered by endorsements of federal commandeering power.241 Yet the 
decision not to commandeer state judges as part of the Judiciary Act left open 
the possibility that a silent majority in Congress agreed with Ames and Maclay. 
Early statutes placing duties on state judicial officers settle these doubts. 
Majorities in both the House and Senate in the First Congress and in 
subsequent Congresses repeatedly rejected Ames’s and Maclay’s proposition 
that the federal government could not commandeer state officials.242 
This conclusion is bolstered by a bill passed during the Second Congress 
that imposed a federal duty on state governors. The bill, which regulated 
presidential elections, provided “[t]hat the executive authority of each state 
shall cause three lists of the names of the electors of such state to be made and 
certified and to be delivered to the electors” before the election.243 Nathaniel 
Niles, an Anti-Federalist congressman from the recently admitted state of 
Vermont, moved to eliminate that provision based on his objection to 
commandeering. “[N]o person could be called upon to discharge any duty on 
 
239.  LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 75 (2004). 
240.  For Fisher Ames’s views, see supra notes 180-183 and accompanying text. For William 
Maclay’s views, see supra notes 195-198 and accompanying text. 
241.  See, e.g., supra notes 130 (James Winthrop; Samuel Spencer), 133-135 (Alexander Hamilton), 
158 (Patrick Henry), 184 (Michael Stone), 185-186 (Samuel Livermore), 188 (Elbridge 
Gerry), 222 (Edward Carrington), and accompanying text. 
242.  See supra notes 229-234 and accompanying text. 
243.  Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 3, 1 Stat. 239, 240. David Currie also argues that another early 
congressional bill regarding crimes against Indians “arguably suggested” a “co-opt[ation] 
[of] state officers to enforce federal law.” CURRIE, supra note 186, at 86-87. 
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behalf of the United States,” Niles asserted, “who had not accepted of an 
appointment under their authority.”244 Theodore Sedgwick, a leading 
Federalist from Massachusetts, disagreed. “[I]f Congress were not authorized 
to call on the Executives of the several States,” Sedgwick stated, he “could not 
conceive what description of persons they were empowered to call upon.”245 
Niles replied that he “considered this section as degrading to the Executive of 
the several States.”246 Federalist James Hillhouse of Connecticut agreed that 
Congress should amend the bill, but he offered a different reason. According to 
Hillhouse, the proposed bill “imposed a duty on the Supreme Executives of the 
several States, which they might, or might not execute; and thus the necessary 
certificates may not be made.”247 In other words, Hillhouse questioned the 
bill’s practicability because it entrusted federal responsibilities to 
unaccountable state officers. Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire—an 
opponent of the Judiciary Act of 1789 who later voted mostly with the 
Federalists—supported the clause and “did not consider it either as an undue 
assumption of power, or degrading to the Executives of the respective 
States.”248 The House then voted down Niles’s motion, thus retaining the 
federal duty placed on state executives.249 Having directly debated 
commandeering’s constitutionality, the Second Congress enacted a law that 
explicitly commandeered state governors. 
As shown thus far, federal commandeering power was acknowledged and 
employed by majorities in the early Congresses. Not everyone, though, 
accepted this federal power. In 1792, while considering a militia bill that would 
have required local justices of the peace to issue warnings to rebellious 
assemblies, two Federalists openly questioned commandeering power. 
Representative Abraham Clark of New Jersey, a supporter of the Washington 
Administration, “inquired whether the United States have a right to call on the 
 
244.  3 ANNALS OF CONG. 279 (1791) (remarks of Rep. Nathaniel Niles). Niles’s comment flew 
directly in the face of the ratification debates regarding the posse comitatus, because neither 
the state sheriffs nor the local citizens who comprised the posse were federally appointed 
officers. 
245.  Id. (remarks of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick). 
246.  Id. (remarks of Rep. Nathaniel Niles). 
247.  Id. (remarks of Rep. James Hillhouse). The phrase “might, or might not execute” raises, but 
does little to answer, interesting questions about the extent to which the federal government 
had prophylactic remedies to compel state-officer compliance with federal demands. See 
infra p. 1178. 
248.  3 ANNALS OF CONG. 279 (1791) (remarks of Rep. Samuel Livermore). Livermore had 
endorsed commandeering power in the 1789 debates over the Judiciary Act. See supra note 
186. 
249.  3 ANNALS OF CONG. 280 (1791); see Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, § 3, 1 Stat. 239, 240 (1792). 
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justices of the peace to execute the laws of Congress? [I]f they have no such 
right, the amendment, so far as it respects those officers, is nugatory.”250 
Alexander White of Virginia, also a Federalist, echoed Clark’s skepticism, 
stating that he “was in favor of the clause generally, but said he had no idea 
that the General Government had any right to call on the officers of the 
particular States to execute the laws of the Union.”251 Elbridge Gerry responded 
with an unequivocal affirmation of federal commandeering power. After 
“adverting to several parts of the Constitution,” Gerry observed that “nothing 
could be plainer than this—that the General Government had a right to require 
the assistance of the officers of the several State Governments; for they have 
severally taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States.”252 
Unsurprisingly, Gerry did not invoke the Supremacy Clause’s language about 
state judges being bound to apply federal law, nor did he defend the proposal 
based on a justice of the peace’s status as a local judge. Rather, like many 
before him, Gerry cited the Oath Clause, which does not distinguish between 
executive and judicial officers. The next speaker, Federalist John Kittera of 
Pennsylvania, ignored the constitutional issue and instead argued that 
requiring justices of the peace to read official warnings would merely 
exacerbate insurrections.253 Congress then voted down the idea without 
recording the vote and without further comment. 
D. A Judicial Response 
Based largely on Federalist policy preferences and Virginia’s Disqualifying 
Act, a burgeoning federal administration evolved in place of what could have 
been a blended federal and state bureaucracy. With only the few exceptions 
mentioned above, early Congresses did not require state officers to enforce 
federal law. Instead, Congress created federal judges, federal tax collectors, 
federal customs houses, and a federal marshal service. The paucity of 
commandeering statutes limited the opportunities for judicial consideration of 
whether Congress may commandeer state executive officers. There was, 
however, one exception. 
In the early 1790s, Congress passed a series of excise taxes on distilled 
 
250.  3 ANNALS OF CONG. 579 (1792) (remarks of Rep. Abraham Clark). 
251.  Id. (remarks of Rep. Alexander White). 
252.  Id. (remarks of Rep. Elbridge Gerry). Gerry had also recognized federal commandeering 
power during the debate over the Judiciary Act of 1789. See supra note 187 and 
accompanying text. 
253.  3 ANNALS OF CONG. 579 (1792) (stating that the provision, “far from operating to suppress 
insurrections, would produce them in a much greater degree”). 
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spirits. These deeply divisive laws were generally ignored west of the 
Appalachians, where necessarily long delays in transporting produce to outside 
markets meant that easily preservable and transportable alcoholic beverages 
were the region’s economic mainstay. In these parts, occasional attempts to 
enforce the excise laws often met with violent opposition. Although the 
Washington Administration orchestrated a successful publicity stunt in 1794 by 
demonstrating its fortitude in the face of the so-called Whiskey Rebellion in 
western Pennsylvania, noncompliance with the excise laws remained rampant, 
especially in Kentucky. 
The refusal of one Kentuckian to pay the excise tax on his whiskey distillery 
gave rise to the only known Founding-era judicial test of commandeering’s 
constitutionality. The controversy began in 1797, when John Mannen failed to 
pay his federal tax. When a state tax collector and the local constable arrived to 
enforce the debt on behalf of the federal marshal, Mannen brandished two 
pistols and drove them away. In 1800, a federal grand jury indicted Mannen for 
violating a federal law against obstructing federal officers during the course of 
their official duties.254 Mannen was convicted, but he argued on appeal that the 
state officials he had threatened were not “officers of the United States,” and 
therefore his assault of those officers was not punishable as a federal crime.255 
Harry Innes, a longtime federal judge who was then sitting on the newly 
reorganized Sixth Circuit, delivered the opinion in United States v. Mannen in 
1802.256 Judge Innes observed that the defense had raised “an important 
 
254.  Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 22, 1 Stat. 112, 117 (“[I]f any person or persons shall knowingly 
and wilfully obstruct, resist or oppose any officer of the United States, in serving or 
attempting to serve or execute any mesne process, or warrant, or any rule or order of any of 
the courts of the United States, or any other legal or judicial writ or process whatsoever, or 
shall assault, beat or wound any officer, or other person duly authorized, in serving or 
executing any writ, rule, order, process or warrant aforesaid, every person so knowingly and 
wilfully offending in the premises, shall, on conviction thereof, be imprisoned not exceeding 
twelve months, and fined not exceeding three hundred dollars.”). It is unknown why 
Mannen was not charged under the clause applying to assaults against “any officer or other 
person, duly authorized, in serving” federal process, but the “bumbling efforts” of 
prosecutor William Clarke may have been the reason. See MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, 
FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: KENTUCKY 1789-1816, at 73 (1978) (describing 
Clarke’s “bumbling efforts” as prosecutor, though not with respect to Mannen in particular). 
255.  United States v. Mannen (6th Cir. 1802) [hereinafter Mannen], in INNESS’ REPORTS: 
FEDERAL COURT, DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 1795-1806, at 172, 177-78 (original bound 
manuscript of Innes’s opinions belonging to the Filson Historical Society). 
256.  Judge Innes’s opinion has never been published. Therefore, with permission I have 
transcribed below the relevant portions from the bound opinion book in the Filson 
Historical Society, in Louisville, Kentucky. A draft of the opinion is in the Harry Innes 
Papers, at the Library of Congress. All punctuation and spelling have been preserved.  
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[*177] The second point made in this Motion is that the Collector or 
Constable were not officers of the U. States and in the execution of that kind of 
process which is described in the 22d sect. of the Act of Congress [*178] for the 
punishment of certain crimes against the U. States which Act was permitted to be 
given in evidence to the Jury. 
This question involves an important consideration because the power of 
Congress to require any service to be performed by a State Officer in his official 
capacity is denied. 
That such a power rests in Congress is evident from the Constitution & Laws 
of the U. States which are the Supreme Law of the Land. 
In article 1st & Sect. 8th of the Constitution of the U. States it is declared the 
Congress shall have power – to lay and collect taxes, duties imposts & excises  
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by this Constitution 
in the government of the U.S. or in any department or office thereof 
By Art. 3d Sect. 2, the Judicial power of the U.S. shall extend to all cases in 
Law and equity ariseing under this Constitution, the Laws of the U.S. & Treaties 
made or [*179] or which shall be made under their Authority 
By Article 4th Section 2 a person charged with Felony Treason or other Crime 
who shall flee from Justice and be found in another State shall on demand of the 
executive authority of the State from which he fled be delivered up to be removed 
to the State having jurisdiction of the Crime 
By the 6th Article this Constitution and the Laws of the U.S. which shall be 
made in pursuance thereof and all treaties &c shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land & the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby any thing in the Laws & 
Constitution of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding 
The first step taken by Congress at their first session under the Constitution 
is the Act to regulate [*180] the time and manner of administering certain Oaths. 
The first Oath described in that Act is to support the Constitution of the U.S. 
This Law not only requires all the executive and Judicial officers of the several 
States who were then in office to take this Oath but all such who thereafter shall 
be appointed – From this view of the subject it is evident that the officers of the 
State Governments are to certain intents compelled to act officially in order to 
carry into effect particular Laws of the U.S. and when doing so must be 
considered as acting under their authority to prove which I will state three 
examples which occur. 1 By the Law establishing the Judicial Courts of the U.S. 
Criminals against the U.S. may be arrested by any Justice of the peace or other 
Magistrate of any of the U.S. 2 By the Law respecting Fugitives from justice it is 
made the Duty of the executive magistrate of any state upon a legal demand of the 
Governor of another state or of either of the Territories to cause such Fugitive to 
be arrested & secured. 
Thirdly the Case in the present Context whereby the Law respecting the 
excise a Justice [*181] of peace is authorized by special warrant to authorize any of 
the Officers of inspection to search for spirits fraudulently hid or concealed in the 
presence of a Constable or other officer of the peace. 
To oppose obstruct or resist the authority of a State Officer when acting in 
conformity to the Constitution & Laws of the U.S. is as much a violation of the 
Laws as opposeing obstructing and resisting an Officer immediately acting by 
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consideration because the power of Congress to require any service to be 
performed by a state officer in his official capacity is denied.”257 Judge Innes 
then flatly rejected the defendant’s argument. “That such a power rests in 
Congress,” he declared, “is evident from the Constitution & Laws of the 
U. States which are the Supreme Law of the Land.”258 According to Judge 
Innes, the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress authority to pass laws 
to effectuate its enumerated powers. The First Congress had exercised its 
constitutional authority over state officers, he stated, when it passed the Oath 
Act during its first session. Under this law, he wrote, “all the executive and 
Judicial officers of the several states . . . are to certain intents compelled to act 
officially in order to carry into effect particular laws of the U.S. and when 
doing so must be considered as acting under [federal] authority.”259 Judge 
Innes then cited three examples to bolster his conclusion. First, the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 empowered local justices of the peace and magistrates to arrest 
federal criminals.260 Second, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 required state 
officials to apprehend and return fugitive slaves.261 Third, under the excise tax 
 
virtue of a Commission issued under the authority of the U.S. and the happiness 
of Society depends upon supporting this opinion. 
There can exist no doubt of the power being vested in the Justice of the peace 
to issue the warrant to Machir to search the Houses where he suspected spirits 
were fraudulently concealed – Machir is an Officer of the U.S. – Hamar the 
Constable is virtually so when called upon by the collector in his official capacity 
to do a duty which is required of him by a law of the U.S. enacted under the 
Constitution and which he is sworn to support. 
  Mannen, supra note 255, at 177-81. The opinion later provides the first names of Peter Machir 
and James Hamar. See id. at 192. 
257.  Id. at 178. 
258.  Id. 
259.  Id. at 180. For clarity, I have substituted “[federal]” in place of “their.” In the eighteenth 
century, collective nouns usually took plural pronouns. 
260.  Id. at 180; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91. 
261.  Mannen, supra note 255, at 180; see Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 302, 302. The 
modern view of the Fugitive Slave Act is that it directly implemented the Fugitive Slave 
Clause in Article IV. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 908-09 (1997). But although 
modern courts consider that Clause and the adjacent Extradition Clause “clear and explicit” 
in placing duties on state executives, see Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 286 (1978), these 
provisions are actually worded in the passive voice, stating that fugitives shall “be delivered 
up,” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. As Justice Story wrote: 
The slave is to be delivered up on the claim. By whom to be delivered up? In what 
mode to be delivered up? . . . 
. . . The clause is found in the national Constitution, and not in that of any 
state. It does not point out any state functionaries, or any state action to carry its 
provisions into effect. The states cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce them; 
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law, “a justice of peace is authorized by special warrant to authorize any of the 
Officers of inspection to search for spirits fraudulently hid or concealed in the 
presence of a constable or other officer of the peace.”262 
Having confirmed the power of Congress to compel state officers to enforce 
federal law, Innes then concluded that resisting a state officer during the 
exercise of this responsibility was tantamount to resisting a federal officer. 
“[T]he happiness of society,” he remarked, “depends upon supporting this 
opinion.”263 Innes’s decision was resolute: The Necessary and Proper Clause 
gives Congress authority to commandeer state executive officials in furtherance 
of enumerated federal powers. Congress had exercised this prerogative by 
passing the Oath Act and, subsequently, the excise law. 
Innes’s opinion underscores that although the Founders were divided 
politically over whether the federal government should use state officers to 
enforce federal law, they were not divided about commandeering in ways that 
we might expect today. In fact, Innes was probably the most antinationalist of 
any federal judge at the time. “[I]f the Constitution is adopted by us,” he wrote 
to a close friend in 1788, “we shall be the mere vassals of the Congress and the 
consequences to me are horrible and dreadful.”264 Nor did he lose his antipathy 
toward federal power after becoming a federal judge. According to one scholar, 
“Innes’s interests were almost strictly parochial: he was first a Kentuckian and 
only distantly and secondly an American. The strength of his political 
convictions owed more to his uncompromising antifederalism than to any 
 
and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of 
interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into 
effect the duties of the national government, nowhere delegated or intrusted to 
them by the Constitution. On the contrary, the natural, if not the necessary 
conclusion is, that the national government, in the absence of all positive 
provisions to the contrary, is bound, through its own proper departments, 
legislative, judicial, or executive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the 
rights and duties imposed upon it by the Constitution. 
  Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 615-16 (1842). Though he reached the wrong result, 
Justice Story was right to recognize the link between commandeering and the meaning of 
Article IV. If requiring state officials to enforce federal duties were an encroachment on state 
sovereignty and fundamentally incompatible with federalism, it would be odd for the 
Framers to have written such a requirement in the passive voice. 
262.  Mannen, supra note 255, at 180-81; see Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 32, 1 Stat. 199, 207. 
263.  Mannen, supra note 255, at 181. 
264.  Letter from Harry Innes to John Brown (Feb. 20, 1788), in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 385, 387 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1988); 
see also id. at 386 (“[T]he adoption of that Constitution would be the destruction of our 
young & flourishing country [of Kentucky].”). 
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positive adoption of Jeffersonian principles.”265 Innes’s opinion therefore not 
only reaffirms the Founding generation’s views about the constitutionality of 
commandeering; it also further debunks the notion that any disputes over that 
power would have split along modern ideological lines, with Anti-Federalists 
opposed to “greater” federal power. 
iv.  commandeering and constitutional change 
Though driven by concerns other than commandeering’s constitutionality, 
early congressional decisions had a tremendous impact on how people thought 
about the interplay between commandeering and federalism. Despite 
Federalists’ ratification-era assurances to the contrary, Congress nearly always 
decided that federal laws should be administered by federal officials and 
enforced by the federal judiciary. With only rare exceptions, state officers had 
little role in administering federal laws. Gradually, this effective separation 
between state and federal officers evolved into a widely acknowledged—though 
never universally accepted—constitutional norm. 
To be sure, flickers of anticommandeering sentiment appeared during the 
First Congress. But these lone voices were overwhelmed by the chorus of 
individuals who endorsed federal commandeering power. As the 1790s 
progressed, however, doubts about commandeering grew more frequent, 
especially among Federalists, whose opposition to state-based enforcement of 
federal law grew even more resolute266 and who gradually developed a 
constitutional critique supporting that goal. In the late 1790s, for example, 
Congress debated a bill that would have required Virginian executive officials 
to license ship pilots from Maryland. Federalist Joshua Coit of Connecticut 
“objected to the principle, from doubts whether they had a right to direct the 
affairs of a State Government to do certain acts.”267 Republican Samuel Smith 
of Maryland replied that “these [state] officers might be directed to grant 
licenses to these pilots on the same ground that the Judges and Justices of the 
States are directed to do the business of the United States.”268 But Federalist 
Samuel Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania “did not allow the analogy of the two 
 
265.  TACHAU, supra note 254, at 38. It is possible that during ratification Judge Innes may have 
understood the Constitution to permit commandeering. See Political Club of Danville, 
Kentucky, supra note 163, at 414 (remarks of Harry Innes) (noting that federal power to 
commandeer the posse comitatus is “necessary to enforce the Collection of Taxes”). 
266.  See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 209 (2010). 
267.  6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983 (1797). 
268.  Id. 
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cases.”269 The better comparison, he argued, was Congress’s decision in 1789 to 
request that each state “provide for the safe-keeping of the prisoners of the 
United States.”270 The House then tabled the bill.271 Federalists also expressed 
anticommandeering sentiments during debates over the Judiciary Act of 
1801.272 And by 1802, Hamilton observed that “the right to employ the agency 
of the State Courts for executing the laws of the Union, is liable to question, 
and has, in fact, been seriously questioned.”273 One can only assume that a 
different political course in the First Congress would have laid the foundation 
for a very different understanding of federalism.274 
One factor further opening the door to an emerging anticommandeering 
doctrine was the decline of the Oath Clause as plausible textual evidence of 
commandeering’s constitutionality. During and immediately after ratification, 
Americans had not yet settled on the meaning of many constitutional 
provisions, including the Oath Clause.275 Anti-Federalists in particular argued 
that the Oath Clause obliged state officers to enforce federal law, at least when 
called upon by Congress to do so. The strong form of the argument quickly 
proved too much. Richard Henry Lee, for example, had asserted that the Oath 
Clause itself required state judges to hear federal cases, but that position 
became untenable after Congress decided to vest jurisdiction exclusively in 
federal courts for most federal causes of action.276 Proponents of a smaller 
federal government were left with the more limited argument that the federal 
oath implied that state officers would have federal duties. But given the political 
rejection of a blended federal administration and the gradual decline in the 
 
269.  Id. 
270.  Id.; see also supra note 225 and accompanying text (discussing the jail resolutions). 
271.  6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1983 (1797). 
272.  See, e.g., 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 892 (1801) (remarks of Rep. Robert Goodloe Harper) (“It is 
true that we cannot enforce on the State courts, as a matter of duty, a performance of the 
acts we confide to them . . . .”). 
273.  Hamilton, supra note 16, at 488. 
274.  Cf. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 892 (1801) (remarks of Rep. John Bird) (noting that “our own 
practice destroys” the idea that “as soon as Congress pass a law, there exists a right and a 
duty in the State courts to execute it”). 
275.  For a thorough summary of early congressional debates on various constitutional 
controversies, see 1 CURRIE, supra note 186. 
276.  David E. Engdahl, Federal Question Jurisdiction Under the 1789 Judiciary Act, 14 OKLA. CITY U. 
L. REV. 521, 522 (1989) (pointing out that the 1789 Judiciary Act “distributed virtually all of 
the subject matter jurisdiction contemplated by article III” in the various federal courts). 
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salience of oaths, this argument too became increasingly strained.277 In a state 
of disuse, the Oath Clause argument faded away.278 
Shifts in the Anti-Federalists’ political priorities also help account for the 
erosion in support for the federal commandeering power. During ratification, 
Anti-Federalists accurately predicted the emergence of a federal bureaucracy, 
but their dire forecasts about that bureaucracy turned out to be grossly 
overblown. For instance, rather than bearing down on the people “like a 
Macedonian phalanx,”279 the federal government gathered most of its tax 
revenue through relatively noninvasive import duties.280 In fact, combined 
with the federal assumption of state debts, federal customs duties caused 
overall direct taxation to plummet, thus further reducing the concern that 
states would be left unable to meet their own revenue needs. To be sure, 
federal excise taxes on distilled spirits prompted a political firestorm, most 
famously in the so-called Whiskey Rebellion. But the primary opposition to 
the excise taxes stemmed from their basic unfairness, not abuses relating to 
their collection.281 Moreover, excise taxes went uncollected in many parts of the 
country and were formally repealed in 1802. Thus, by the early nineteenth 
century, Americans had little reason to fear that federal executive officers 
would either act tyrannically or displace state officials. 
Debates about the federal judiciary, of course, remained virulent for many 
years after ratification. It would be an overstatement to say that states’ rights 
proponents in the early republic no longer cared about state judicial 
enforcement of federal law. But it was apparent by the early nineteenth century 
that federal courts were neither displacing their state counterparts nor actively 
 
277.  Judge Innes’s opinion in United States v. Mannen shows that the Oath Clause argument had 
not faded entirely. But Judge Innes also seems to have thought about these questions during 
ratification. See supra note 265. On the assumption that people rarely change their already 
formed opinions, perhaps Mannen is better seen as reflecting a prior era. 
278.  The decline of the Oath Clause argument, however, does not undermine my thesis, which is 
simply that original federalism principles did not bar commandeering, and that the 
anticommandeering doctrine has been contested ever since. 
279.  2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1844 (1790) (remarks of Rep. Josiah Parker). 
280.  Max M. Edling & Mark D. Kaplanoff, Alexander Hamilton’s Fiscal Reform: Transforming the 
Structure of Taxation in the Early Republic, 61 WM. & MARY Q. 713, 722 (2004). 
281.  See, e.g., 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1896 (1791) (remarks of Rep. John Steele) (“He then adverted 
to the operation of an excise, especially in the State of North Carolina, and said that the 
consumption of ardent spirits in that State was so great that the duty would amount 
perhaps to ten times as much as in the State of Connecticut.”); id. at 1908 (remarks of Rep. 
Josiah Parker) (“He then adverted to the unequal operation of an excise, especially on the 
Southern States, which, he said, rendered it entirely contrary to the spirit of the 
Constitution.”). 
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oppressing the citizenry. And contrary to Anti-Federalist fears, the new federal 
government did not create many courthouses, nor did it employ a large cohort 
of marshals, bailiffs, and jailers. “In the general constitutional order of the early 
republic,” Gautham Rao observes, “the lower federal courts played but a 
peripheral role in an era dominated by the ascendancy of the common law and 
state judiciaries.”282 In sum, the primary justifications for commandeering lost 
their luster once the federal government came into existence. 
The emergence of the anticommandeering principle during the 1790s was 
mostly due to Federalist opposition to state enforcement of federal law. After 
the turn of the century, however, states’ rights supporters increasingly joined 
in the attack. State judges, for instance, began articulating theories of a strict 
separation between federal and state responsibilities, largely in an effort to 
insulate their decisions from federal review.283 In one of the most famous 
examples, the Virginia Supreme Court refused to acknowledge the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state courts, holding that in the unique 
American system of dual sovereignty, “each government must act by its own 
organs: from no other can it expect, command, or enforce obedience, even as to 
objects coming within the range of its powers.”284 As the scope of federal 
lawmaking grew, states also cited an interest in not being overwhelmed with 
federal responsibilities unless Congress could show the necessity of using state 
officers.285 
Eventually the anticommandeering doctrine also gained traction in the 
 
282.  Rao, supra note 144, at 17. 
283.  See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, Tapp. Rep. 61, 64 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1816); Jackson v. 
Rose, 2 Va. Cas. 34 (1815). 
284.  Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 8 (1815) (opinion of Cabell, J.), rev’d sub nom. Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). 
285.  In 1816, for example, one state court rejected its own jurisdiction to hear a federal criminal 
case, saying that if Congress had judged state court jurisdiction “to be necessary, I think they 
have been mistaken—convenience is not necessity. Their own tribunals are sufficient to 
enforce their own laws.” Campbell, Tapp. Rep. at 64; see also Worthington v. Masters, 1 J. 
Jurisprudence 196, 203 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1803) (Defense counsel: “[C]ongress, in 
attempting to impose duties upon the state courts, have assumed a power which they are 
not warranted in exercising, unless it can be made [to] appear that this power is necessary to 
the exercise of some power specially granted. This I believe cannot be done. For every 
judicial purpose the union has a judicial power of its own. The aid of the state courts can in 
no case be absolutely necessary.”). The defense counsel in Worthington also noted that 
imposing federally mandated state court duties without paying state judges for their services 
“would embarrass them, throw them into difficulties, [and] compel them to neglect their 
duties or resign their offices,” while payments from the federal government “would have a 
tendency to consolidate the state governments, and destroy insensibly the power and 
independence of the states.” 1 J. Jurisprudence at 201-02. 
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Supreme Court. In the famous fugitive-slave case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 
Justice Story wrote that “it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise 
of the power of interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide 
means to carry into effect the duties of the national government.”286 While 
ostensibly favoring states’ rights, Story actually may have been trying—much 
like the early Federalists—to strengthen federal power. “By removing state 
judges from the process,” Paul Finkelman writes, “[Justice] Story in effect 
forced Congress to assume a more aggressive role in the return of fugitive 
slaves.”287 This illicit motive, of course, did not stop the advancement of 
anticommandeering. Several years after Prigg, Chief Justice Taney announced 
in Kentucky v. Dennison that “the Federal Government, under the Constitution, 
has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and 
compel him to perform it.”288 
Dennison was unequivocal, but it wasn’t the last word. In 1987, the 
Supreme Court reversed course in Puerto Rico v. Branstad, finding that 
“Kentucky v. Dennison is the product of another time” and that its rigid 
conception of state sovereignty is “fundamentally incompatible” with modern 
doctrine.289 The Court further explained that “[t]he fundamental premise of 
the holding in Dennison—‘that the States and the Federal Government in all 
circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns—is not representative of 
the law today.’”290 What is representative of modern law, however, can quickly 
change. Just ten years after Branstad, the Printz majority remarked that 
commandeering is “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system 
of dual sovereignty.”291 Anticommandeering, it seems, has always been a 
doctrine in flux. 
Oscillating views toward commandeering are not surprising. The 
constitutional text has little to say about the issue, and we are long removed 
from the mostly forgotten concerns that motivated the Founders. The 
anticommandeering doctrine’s history also reflects its shifting political valence. 
When support for a federal program is overwhelming but the means of 
 
286.  41 U.S. 539, 616 (1842). 
287.  Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery Constitutionalism, National Law Enforcement, 
Federalism, and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399, 1411 (2004). Indeed, Finkelman 
shows that Justice Story was lobbying to relocate the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act 
away from state officers and into the hands of newly appointed federal commissioners. Id. at 
1412. 
288.  65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861). 
289.  Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 230 (1987). 
290.  Id. at 228 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982)). 
291.  521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
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implementation are contested, the commandeering power may serve state 
interests by offering a viable alternative to purely federal administration. 
Everyone in the First Congress, for instance, knew that federal taxes had to be 
collected and federal crimes judicially enforced, so an anticommandeering 
doctrine would have done little to limit the scope of federal law. Conversely, 
anticommandeering served Justice Story’s nationalist objectives by cutting off a 
less effective method of apprehending fugitive slaves when he knew the 
national government would step in to enforce federal law. When a policy is 
highly contested, though, the anticommandeering doctrine shifts fiscal and 
political costs to the federal government in a way that may defeat the federal 
program entirely. 
How then should self-proclaimed “originalists” use the Founding-era 
history presented in this Article? Originalism comes in many varieties, which 
means no single answer will suffice. Recent originalist scholarship and 
jurisprudence tend to focus on the “original public meaning” of the 
Constitution’s words and phrases. According to this view, “[c]onstitutional 
meaning is fixed by the understandings of the words and phrases and the 
grammar and syntax that characterized the linguistic practices of the public and 
not by the intentions of the framers.”292 The original meaning of the word 
“proper” may—as several originalists have argued, and as the Supreme Court 
has held—prevent the government from unduly infringing upon state 
sovereignty.293 
From the Founding generation’s perspective, however, the Constitution 
does not categorically prevent the federal government from commandeering 
state executive and judicial officers. The Founders simply didn’t think that 
commandeering always violates federalism principles. In fact, many thought 
just the opposite. Anti-Federalists were among the strongest supporters of 
commandeering, and the few dissenters were mostly Federalists wanting to 
retain complete federal control over the administration of federal law. As 
Elbridge Gerry declared, “nothing could be plainer than this—that the General 
Government had a right to require the assistance of the officers of the several 
 
292.  Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A 
DEBATE 1, 4 (Robert W. Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011). 
293.  See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (opinion of 
Roberts, C.J.); Printz, 521 U.S. at 923-24 (citing Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The 
“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE 
L.J. 267, 297-326, 330-33 (1993)); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 217 (2003) (noting that the propriety of certain 
means may be judged in part “according to principles of federalism”). See generally GARY 
LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010). 
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State Governments.”294 At a minimum, then, originalists committed to a belief 
that true constitutional meaning cannot change should recognize that 
commandeering is not—at least not in an unconstructed sense—categorically 
unconstitutional. 
Ironically, the brand of originalism encouraged by Printz’s author, Justice 
Scalia, is also the version most likely to favor the constitutionality of 
commandeering. Justice Scalia generally gives priority to the Founders’ original 
expectations about constitutional meaning.295 “[T]he very acts that were 
perfectly constitutional” at the Founding, he has suggested, cannot “be 
unconstitutional today.”296 For instance, Justice Scalia argues that the Eighth 
Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment should be “rooted in 
the moral perceptions of the” Founding era and thus proscribe not “whatever 
may be considered cruel from one generation to the next,” but what the 
Founders considered cruel in 1791.297 The same could be said for 
commandeering: the Founders accepted the practice, and whatever we think 
today about its impact on federalism values is beside the point. “The 
Constitution,” Justice Scalia has written, “is not an all-purpose tool for judicial 
construction of a perfect world; and when we ignore its text in order to make it 
that, we often find ourselves swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is 
needed.”298 
This is not to suggest that originalists in the mold of Justice Scalia should 
think that commandeering is always constitutional. To offer an outrageous 
example, it is a safe bet that the Founders would not have agreed to the 
constitutionality of a federal mandate that state governors personally ride 
around their states on horseback to count and enumerate each state resident 
 
294.  See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
295.  See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999) (“In determining whether a 
particular governmental action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether 
the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the 
Amendment was framed.”); Antonin Scalia, Response (noting that he interprets a 
constitutional provision “on the basis of the ‘time-dated’ meaning”), in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 148-49 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter Scalia, Response]; Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 
849, 861-62 (1989) (discussing original-applications originalism). But see Lawrence 
Rosenthal, Originalism in Practice, 87 IND. L.J. 1183, 1199-1204 (2012) (providing examples 
where Justice Scalia has deviated from original-applications originalism). 
296.  Scalia, Response, supra note 295, at 141. 
297.  Id. at 145. 
298.  Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1494 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 the yale law journal 122:1104   2013  
1178 
 
once every ten years. As early congressional debates suggest,299 the object, type, 
and degree of burdens placed on state officers are relevant to the 
constitutionality of particular federal mandates. 
Limitations might also exist on how far Congress can go in enforcing its 
mandates. Many Founders thought that the oath helped guarantee state-officer 
compliance with federal responsibilities, and perhaps some individuals viewed 
the oath as the only tool for enforcing federal demands.300 But in other 
instances when state officers had to perform federal functions, the federal 
government could use additional prophylactic measures to compel 
obedience.301 Although most Anti-Federalists likely would not have endorsed 
unlimited federal power to compel state-officer compliance, they would not 
necessarily have rejected coercive means entirely. After all, tailored measures to 
 
299.  See 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 279 (remarks of Rep. Samuel Livermore) (stating that he “did not 
consider [a simple imposition on state governors] either as an undue assumption of power, 
or degrading to the executives of the respective states”). 
300.  In a related context, for instance, Virginia Supreme Court Judge Spencer Roane thought 
that the Constitution’s only “antidote” for ensuring that state courts obey federal law “exists 
in the oath imposed on them . . . to support the constitution of the United States. This 
is . . . the agreed remedy for the evil; and, after this, it does not lie in the mouth of any, to 
raise the objection.” Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. 1, 42 (1815) (opinion of Roane, J.), rev’d sub 
nom. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). Judge Roane also explicitly denounced 
federal commandeering. See id. at 33-36. 
301.  See, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 15 (1820) (“The President’s orders may be 
given to the chief executive magistrate of the State, or to any militia officer he may think 
proper; neglect, or refusal to obey orders, is declared to be an offence against the laws of the 
United States, and subjects the offender to trial, sentence and punishment . . . .”). But 
historical references to enforcement mechanisms other than the oath are relatively 
uncommon. Making matters especially difficult, the Founders often spoke in terms of 
practical authority rather than constitutional authority. One congressman, for instance, 
commented in an editorial: “Is the general government to have a compleat set of officers of 
their own appointment, or to make use of those appointed by the States? If the former, their 
number will be immense; if the latter, they will feel no dependence on the union and cannot 
be brought to account.” Jeremiah Wadsworth, The Observer No. XV (Jan. 18, 1790) (emphasis 
added), reprinted in 18 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1789-1791, at 248, 250 (Charlene Bangs Bickford et al. eds., 
2012). In context, Wadsworth seems to be suggesting that federal coercive remedies exist 
but should never be relied upon. One limitation on prophylactic measures—and perhaps 
this was Wadsworth’s point—may be a bar against terminating officers’ state jobs. See H.R. 
Debate (Aug. 29, 1789), supra note 172, at 1369 (remarks of Rep. Theodore Sedgwick) 
(“Suppose [state judges] . . . might refuse or neglect to attend to the national business; . . . 
where is our mean of redress? Shall we apply to the state legislatures that patronize them? 
Can we impeach or have them tried? If we can, how is the trial to be had, before a tribunal 
established by the state? Can we expect in this way to bring them to justice? Surely no 
gentleman supposes we can.”). To be sure, the problems here are vexing, especially with 
respect to disciplining disobedient state judges. 
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promote compliance with federal duties would have encouraged Congress to 
rely on state officers in the first place.302 
For some originalists, however, the Founders’ views about commandeering 
may not be dispositive. If we assume that the original meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause prevents Congress from violating state 
sovereignty, some originalists may argue that that original meaning does not 
freeze in place all the potential ways in which sovereignty interests may be 
violated. In other words, the Constitution may ban Congress from using 
means that violate federalism values, but the linguistic meaning of the 
constitutional text may not embalm a particular list of policies that offend these 
values. In a closely related context, for instance, whether means are “necessary” 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause does not depend on whether those 
means were thought necessary at the Founding.303 
This version of originalism—one that conceptually separates the original 
linguistic meaning of the constitutional text from the way that the text would 
have been originally applied—may be capable of vindicating modern 
anticommandeering doctrine. That is, perhaps federalism values have evolved 
such that commandeering is now inconsistent with “our constitutional system 
of dual sovereignty,” thus making it appropriate for judges to “construct” an 
anticommandeering rule. For instance, perhaps the temptation of placing 
federal responsibilities on state officers without having to pay the political cost 
of supporting those officers would lead Congress to abuse such a power. 
If the justification for anticommandeering is mostly prudential rather than 
historical, however, then one wonders why the Supreme Court did not adopt 
Justice Souter’s suggestion that the Court might ban only unfunded 
 
302.  The same logic helps explain Anti-Federalist support for commandeering. See supra p. 1153. 
Moreover, we should be careful not to conflate commandeering’s constitutionality with the 
availability of federal prophylactic remedies over disobedient state officers. If the Framers, 
for example, had adopted Roger Sherman’s proposal that federal laws “be carried into 
execution by the judiciary and executive officers of the respective states, wherein the 
execution thereof is required,” supra note 96, the exact same questions about prophylactic 
remedies would still have surfaced. And even if Congress lacked any practical means of 
compelling state-officer obedience, the constitutionality of commandeering as a legal matter 
would still resolve a host of interesting legal issues. 
303.  Whether a law is “necessary” to effectuate an enumerated power depends on empirical facts 
that may change over time, thus leading to developments unanticipated by the Founders. 
See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (“The Federal Government 
undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers . . . . Yet the 
powers conferred upon the Federal Government by the Constitution were phrased in 
language broad enough to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role.” 
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992))). 
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mandates.304 Justice Scalia offered one answer, remarking that a rule requiring 
reasonable federal payments “would create a constitutional jurisprudence (for 
determining when the compensation was adequate) that would make takings 
cases appear clear and simple.”305 Not surprisingly, the Printz majority instead 
adopted a bright-line rule barring commandeering entirely, which is perhaps 
the only judicially administrable way to enforce the real (though decidedly not 
rule-based) constitutional value of state autonomy. 
Our modern aversion to unfunded federal mandates, however, is yet 
another reminder of how distant we are from the concerns of our constitutional 
forebears. Echoing earlier colonial-era and confederation-era debates,  
Anti-Federalists worried that federal emoluments would pry away state-officer 
loyalties and breach the independence of state governments. And the modern 
aversion to cost shifting is even more discordant with Founding-era views in 
light of Anti-Federalists’ continued support for requisitions, which allowed the 
federal government to demand that states turn over tax revenue. As James 
Ferguson notes, the requisitions scheme “had its drawbacks, but it preserved a 
degree of local control of the purse strings, and wherever the Antifederalists 
had any strength they brought it forward.”306 The cost shifting created by 
commandeering state officers is a small pittance compared to that imposed by 
federally mandated revenue transfers. 
History may help guide our thinking on these constitutional issues, but it 
does not resolve how we should account for changing circumstances or how 
the Court should incorporate prudential considerations into its constitutional 
analysis. If we carefully examine the Founders’ views about commandeering, 
 
304.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 975-76 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I do not read 
any of The Federalist material as requiring the conclusion that Congress could require 
administrative support without an obligation to pay fair value for it.”). 
305.  Id. at 914 n.7 (majority opinion). 
306.  FERGUSON, supra note 18, at 291; see also Ames, supra note 191, at 242-43 (discussing early 
proposed amendments to make requisitions the constitutionally preferred method of raising 
federal revenue); Jensen & Entin, supra note 12 (discussing federal power to commandeer 
state legislatures). Whether the federal government had any prophylactic remedies for 
enforcing requisitions is another matter. Some individuals thought that Congress could use 
force against noncompliant state legislatures. See, e.g., Wadsworth, supra note 301, at 250 
(“That the general government possesses a coercive power over an individual State, is 
allowed on all hands . . . .”). But those same individuals often thought that Congress should 
never exercise that authority. See, e.g., id. (“If the general government must ever use 
coercion, let it be to execute their own laws and grants; and let individuals and not States be 
the subjects of it.”); see also Clark, supra note 75, at 1839-62 (presenting evidence about 
federal power to “coerce” state legislative compliance—evidence that, in my view, almost 
entirely relates to how, if at all, the federal government might obtain compliance with legally 
binding federal duties). 
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however, we might also recognize the legitimacy of countervailing federalism 
concerns that militate in favor of requiring state officers to enforce federal law. 
As many Anti-Federalists thought, the power to commandeer can facilitate 
federal use of state officers, thus giving state officers greater control over 
federal policy and reducing the size of the federal bureaucracy.307 Going a step 
further than Anti-Federalists went (at least openly), modern scholars have 
pointed out that commandeering may also beneficially foster state-based 
opposition to unwanted federal laws because “the very threat of ‘being pressed 
into federal service’—of having to enforce federal law—may drive states to 
contest such law on the merits.”308 Commandeering, in other words, can 
harness institutional dissent in a way that more effectively constrains federal 
power. Whether the anticommandeering doctrine survives future shifts in the 
Supreme Court’s membership may rest on how the Justices continue to balance 
these competing federalism concerns. 
 
 
307.  The Printz dissenters made the same point. See 521 U.S. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that commandeering “is obviously more deferential to state sovereignty concerns 
than a national government that uses its own agents to impose its will directly on the 
citizenry”); id. at 976-77 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (making the same point with respect to 
European practices). 
308.  Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 
1298 (2009) (footnote omitted) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 905). 
